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ABSTRACT 
YING ROSELYN DU: Mass Media’s Agenda-Setting Function in the Age of 
Globalization: A Multi-National Agenda-Setting Test 
(Under the direction of Donald Shaw) 
 
 
This dissertation explores mass media’s agenda-setting function in a context of 
increased globalization to determine whether the theory, which was built upon intra-
nation environments, functions in the global setting. The study matches public agendas 
with media agendas to investigate agenda-setting effects in 11 countries worldwide. It 
also compares media agendas across countries, both at the object level and the attribute 
level, to consider whether inter-nation intermedia influence exists.  
The results suggest a general pattern of the agenda-setting function of mass media 
in the countries examined. The study finds evidence of inter-nation intermedia influence 
and thus presents a new way to look at the intermedia agenda-setting relationship – 
moving this research from comparisons within a local area to cross-national intermedia 
comparisons.  
Moreover, this study explores for evidence of directional inter-nation intermedia 
agenda-setting, presuming that the media of the pivotal and powerful West have stronger 
influence on their non-Western counterparts than vice versa. Due to the lack of evidence 
found, the study cannot argue a general causality between Western and non-Western 
countries’ media. 
Finally, the study examines second level intermedia agenda-setting effect at the 
 iii
global level to determine whether the attribute agendas of the media in different countries 
are dissimilar. The multi-national investigation did not yield clear-cut results. Findings 
suggest a complex inter-nation intermedia relationship at the attribute level and imply 
that, in the age of globalization, a simple “ideological difference” reasoning derived from 
the Cold War days is probably outdated.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
The idea of agenda-setting travels widely and well. The phrase itself rarely 
requires translation and has been used in studies in at least 15 countries around the world. 
Yet few systematic cross-national comparative studies have ever been undertaken. On 
one hand, agenda-setting may be a truly universal phenomenon that cuts without 
distinction across all cultures, post-industrial or pre-industrial, sectarian or secular, and 
all kinds of media systems, authoritarian or free, partisan or professional, sophisticated or 
primitive. If so, a major explanation of media influence is universal, and can be studied 
with equal productivity in any country. On the other hand, differences in media systems 
may have implications for media effects at both the individual and collective level, and 
thus the agenda-setting process may differ from country to country.  
Agenda-setting research is now well into its fourth decade of existence and 
development. Most of the hundreds of agenda-setting studies have a made-in-the-U.S.A. 
label. Although there are some studies that have explored the agenda-setting process in 
other countries, such as Japan, Spain, and Germany, few of them have been able to 
examine more than one country and provide comparative information. This is because, 
perhaps, it is difficult to conduct multinational studies for feasibility and practicality 
reasons. Collecting data from different countries is a hard task, which demands extensive 
international cooperation and inevitable compromises. 
A chance to replicate and extend the original agenda-setting study – a comparison 
of the salience of a set of objects measured in public opinion and media content – across 
a wide range of political and media systems, is a target of opportunity that should not be 
missed. One such opportunity occurred in early 2006, when PIPA (The Program on 
International Policy Attitudes) released the report for the BBC World Service poll of 27 
countries from around the world, which asks a question that is strikingly similar to 
measures used in many of the agenda-setting studies in the past 40 years:  “In the future, 
when historians think about the year 2005, what event of global significance do you think 
will be seen as most important?” This has brought forth the possibility of a multinational 
agenda-setting test. 
In this study, results of the BBC study in 11 countries were matched with a 
content analysis of major media in those countries to examine the correspondence 
between media agendas and public agendas in a variety of political and media systems 
and then to compare media agendas across the countries to identify whether international 
intermedia agenda-setting effects may exist – for instance, whether the United States or 
Western media set the agenda for other media systems nearer the periphery of the global 
system.  
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CHAPTER 2 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Agenda-Setting Function of Mass Media 
 Agenda-setting theory contends that the mass media tell the public not only what 
to think about, but also how to think about it – the first process, or first level of agenda-
setting, is about the transfer of the salience of issues, or items, on the media agenda to the 
public agenda, while the second process, or second level of agenda-setting (also called 
framing1), is about the transfer of the salience of selected attributes. Since the initial 
Chapel Hill study by McCombs and Shaw (1972) found that the public’s perception of 
the relative importance of issues is determined to a strong degree by the amount of media 
coverage devoted to issues, hundreds of follow-up studies have found a link between 
public concerns and media emphasis. 
With or without the label, the idea of agenda-setting has been with us since the 
days of the penny press. In his early work, Lippmann (1922) contended that people do 
 
1 Attribute agenda-setting merges agenda-setting theory with the concept of framing in framing 
theory. While some scholars suggest the interchangeable usages of attribute agenda and frames 
for theoretical parsimony, others, represented by Scheufele (2000), contend to keep distance 
between the two theories. They argue that framing is quite different than agenda-setting because 
it involves not merely prioritization of individual objects or attributes, but also activation of entire 
interpretive schemas, in other words, invoking schemas that influence the interpretation of 
incoming information. This argument is based on the assumption that subtle changes in the 
wording of the description of a situation might affect how audience members interpret this 
situation. For more information about attribute agenda-setting and framing, see McCombs, M. 
(2004). Setting the agenda: The mass media and public opinion (pp. 86-97). Cambridge, UK: 
Polity Press.  
 
not deal directly with their environments as much as they respond to “pictures” in their 
heads. Although he did not specifically use the term itself, Bernard Cohen is generally 
credited with refining Lippmann’s ideas into the theory of agenda-setting. He argued that 
the world looks different to different people depending on what the press offers them. 
Cohen’s writing became the basis for what we now call the agenda-setting function of the 
mass media. This perspective might have lingered in obscurity if it had not been 
empirically confirmed by research conducted by McCombs and Shaw.  
First-Level Agenda-Setting 
During the 1968 presidential election, McCombs and Shaw conducted the first 
test of Lippmann’s thesis in Chapel Hill, North Carolina. They tested the proposition that 
through their day-by-day selection and display of the news, the mass media influence 
public perceptions of what are the important issues of the day. In particular, they believed 
that a causal relationship existed between the media and the public – over time, the 
priority issues of the news media would become the priority issues of the public. The 
independent variable in the Chapel Hill study was news media agenda. In newspapers, 
cues include the size of the headline, the length of the story, and the page on which the 
story appears. Similar television cues include position of an item in the newscast and the 
length of the story. These cues assist the audience in prioritizing the small number of 
issues selected for attention in the daily news. The dependent variable was public agenda, 
which refers to whether something is perceived as important or prominent. To 
operationalize this concept, McCombs and Shaw focused on one of public opinion’s 
major terms, the public’s perception of the most important problem (MIP) facing the 
country. They then ranked the issues according to the percentage of voters naming each 
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issue. To test the agenda-setting hypothesis, they matched responses to their open-ended 
survey question with a content analysis of the major news sources used by the voters. Just 
as the public agenda of issues had been rank-ordered according to the percentage of 
voters naming an issue, these same issues were rank-ordered on the news agenda 
according to the percentage of news coverage on the issues falling into each category. A 
strong relationship (r = .967) was found between the public’s and the media’s agendas of 
issues. McCombs and Shaw thus labeled this transfer of salience from the media agenda 
to the public agenda the “agenda-setting” influence of mass communication. 
 Lippmann (1922) may have been the intellectual father of the agenda-setting idea, 
yet he did not give the theory its name. Forty years after, the conceptualization of agenda-
setting was advanced by Cohen (1963), who contended that the press may not be 
successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is very successful in 
telling its readers what to think about. Only a few years later was this theoretical notion 
labeled by McCombs and Shaw. They have constructed a model test to determine the 
existence of agenda-setting in mass communications. 
Second-Level Agenda-Setting 
 There has been 40 years of agenda-setting research and development since 
McCombs and Shaw conducted the seminal study in 1968. The vast majority of following 
studies have focused on the first level of agenda-setting, in other words, the issue agenda, 
or objects.2 Second-level agenda-setting, which focuses on the salience of attributes that 
                                            
2 Commenting on the theoretical evolution of the agenda-setting processes, McCombs and Shaw 
(1993) defined a news agenda as any set of objects or a single object competing for the attention 
of the public or the media. This theoretical refinement has spurred an understanding of agenda-
setting effects that has become more sophisticated through expansion in the scope of the 
research. This theoretical refinement justifies the usage of the BBC 2005 Most Significant Event 
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are linked to an object, has been a relatively new addition to the research literature. 
Conventional agenda-setting research has focused at the object level and assessed how 
media coverage could influence the priority assigned to objects (e.g., issues, candidates, 
events, and problems). In doing this, media tell us “what to think about.” However, there 
is another dimension to consider. Media can also tell us “how to think about” some 
objects. Media do this by influencing “attribute agendas.” They tell us which object 
attributes are important and which ones are not. Just as objects vary in salience, so do the 
attributes of each object. Each of those objects has numerous attributes, and those 
attributes define another agenda.  
This second dimension of agenda-setting research examines the transmission of 
attribute salience, which is about the role of the news media in the framing of issues and 
other objects in the public mind. The attributes of a certain object stressed in the media 
share very similar meaning with frames in framing theory. Agenda-setting theory’s fusion 
with framing is a major theoretical extension. The debate over the definitional similarities 
and dissimilarities between attributes in the agenda-setting process and frames in the 
framing process helped agenda-setting theory fine-tune the conceptual ground for the 
attribute agenda-setting effects. 
 Many studies have found empirical evidence of frames in media content. For 
example, in their 1976 presidential campaign study, Weaver et al. (1981) examined the 
images that voters held of presidential candidates. The study followed the classical 
Chapel Hill design, comparison of a media agenda measured by content analysis with a 
public agenda measured through survey research, but with a shift in focus from an agenda 
                                                                                                                                  
Poll data in this study.  
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of objects to an agenda of attributes. They found a high degree of correspondence 
between the agenda of attributes on the news agenda and the attributes salient in voters’ 
minds.  
The term framing may be traced back to Goffman’s (1974) work, in which frames 
were defined as embodiments of “the principles of organization which govern (social) 
events” (p. 10). Framing was then applied to the news process by Tuchman (1978), who 
noted that frames turn non-recognizable happenings or amorphous talk into a discernible 
event. According to Entman (1993), framing essentially involves selection and salience. 
“To frame is to select some aspects of a perceived reality and make them more salient in 
a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, causal 
interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described. 
Typically frames diagnose, evaluate, and prescribe…Frames define problems – determine 
what a causal agent is doing with what costs and benefits, usually measured in terms of 
common cultural values; diagnose causes – identify the forces creating the problem; 
make moral judgments – evaluate causal agents and their effects; and suggest remedies – 
offer and justify treatments for the problems and predict their likely effects.” (p. 52) 
 Depending on how an issue is presented or “framed” in the media, people will 
think about that issue in a particular way. Research into audience frames investigates how 
and to what extent specific media frames influence readers’ or viewers’ perceptions of 
certain issues. It attempts to reveal the extent to which certain audience frames are 
replications of media frames (Scheufele, 1999). Price et al.’s (1997) study provides 
compelling evidence that the frames in the news influenced the topical focus of 
respondents’ thoughts. Their experiment asked a sample of students to respond to a 
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fictitious story about the state funding of their university. Students were randomly 
assigned to different versions of the story, all containing the same core of information but 
varying in their opening and closing paragraphs in accordance with the frame employed, 
which was either conflict, human interest, or personal consequences. Immediately after 
reading the story, the students were asked to write down all the thoughts and feelings that 
they had while reading the story. As the results indicated, the different news frames 
significantly affected both the topical focus and evaluative implications of the thought-
listing responses. In contrast, Valkenburg’s and Semetko’s (1999) study presented their 
readers with real issues that were prominent in the news during the time of data collection 
— increasing crime rates and European integration. Findings of this study also strongly 
verify that news frames can exert a significant effect on audiences’ thoughts and recall. 
As Entman (1993) states, an increase in salience enhances the probability that 
receivers will perceive the information, discern meaning and thus process it, and store it 
in memory. He considers Kahneman’s and Tversky’s (1984) work as “perhaps the most 
widely cited recent example of the power of framing and the way it operates by selecting 
and highlighting some features of reality while omitting others” (p. 53). Kahneman and 
Tversky (1984) asked experimental subjects the following: “Imagine that the U. S. is 
preparing for the outbreak of an unusual Asian disease, which is expected to kill 600 
people. Two alternative programs to combat the disease have been proposed. Assume that 
the exact scientific estimates of the consequences of the programs are as follows: If 
program A is adopted, 200 people will be saved. If program B is adopted, there is a one-
third probability that 600 people will be saved and a two-thirds probability that no people 
will be saved. Which of the two programs would you favor?” (p. 343). In this experiment, 
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72% of subjects chose Program A; 28% chose Program B. In the next experiment, 
identical options to treating the same described situation were offered, but framed in 
terms of likely deaths rather than likely lives saved: “If program C is adopted, 400 people 
will die. If Program D is adopted, there is a one-third probability that nobody will die and 
a two-thirds probability that 600 people will die” (p. 343). The percentages choosing the 
options were reversed by the framing. Program C was chosen by 22%, though its twin 
Program A was selected by 72%; and Program D amassed 78%, while the identical 
Program B received only 28%.  
As this classical experiment illustrates, the frame determines whether most people 
notice and how they understand and remember a problem, as well as how they evaluate 
and decide to act upon it. This is a typical experiment that clearly demonstrates that 
frames select and call attention to particular aspects of the reality described. This, 
simultaneously, means that frames draw people’s attention away from other aspects. As 
Entman (1993) concludes, receivers’ responses are clearly affected if they observe and 
process information about one interpretation and have little or incommensurable data 
about alternatives.  
Ideology as a Source of News Framing 
 Although news media and practitioners are supposed and profess to be objective, 
neutral and impartial, they do not operate in a social, political, economic and ideological 
vacuum. “Among the few certainties produced by six decades of research in mass 
communication is the dictum that news is a socially created product, not a reflection of an 
objective reality” (Akhavan-Majid & Ramaprasad, 1998).  News frames, or internal 
structures of the mind, often are based not on individual values but rather on external 
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values such as social norms, organizational constraints, and interest-group pressures 
(Tuchman, 1978), or as Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998) put it, on “an invocation 
of socially created collective universals and traditional understandings to define and 
interpret new issues at hand.” Durham (1998) maintains that journalistic frames develop 
primarily through the reporter-source relationship, where eventual agreement on the 
nature of a story between the two becomes assumed.  Merrill and Odell (1983) contend 
that journalists adapt to the social good (or supposed social good) at the expense of their 
conscience and existential responsibility.  
Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998) argue that ideology is a major source of 
framing in the news, and framing is an important mechanism by which ideology is 
transmitted through the news.  “As a socially constructed product, news is influenced by 
a host of political, economic, and ideological factors, and open to a fascinating process of 
cognitive simplification called framing” (p. 52). According to Akhavan-Majid and 
Ramaprasad, three types of ideology may be expected to exert primary influence on the 
framing of news: dominant ideology (views and ideas shared by the majority of people in 
a given society), elite ideology (the particular ideology or policy orientation on the part of 
the government or the administration in power at any given point in time), and 
journalistic ideology, or occupational ideology (arising mainly from media routines and 
occupational value).  Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad employ quantitative and 
qualitative methods to explore the operation of framing in the U.S. and Chinese coverage 
of the Fourth U.N. Conference on Women and the Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGO) Forum in Beijing in 1995, finding that the coverage in both countries clearly 
reflected the mutually reinforcing operation of the dominant, elite, and journalistic 
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ideologies as primary sources of influence on framing of the news. As Akhavan-Majid 
and Ramaprasad conclude: 
“The findings of this study point to a prominent role played by dominant 
ideology in the framing of international news. In the context of news work, 
and in the case of international news coverage in particular, the dominant 
ideology of the nation (be it capitalist or communist) appears to function as 
a major source of framing. Although individual journalists can, and 
sometimes do, succeed in stepping outside such ideological boundaries, 
their overwhelming tendency to draw on ideologically driven frames serves 
as a powerfully mechanism by which dominant ideology is transmitted and 
perpetuated through news media” (p. 150). 
 
Theoretical Critiques 
The important and straightforward Chapel Hill study highlights both the strengths 
and limitations of agenda-setting as a theory of media effects. “Agenda-setting” implies 
causality, but correlation statistics do not serve the purpose of such a hypothesis test. 
Direction of agenda-setting effect is questioned by some scholars: What is the actual 
nature of the relationship between news and its audience? Could it be the public setting 
the media’s agenda and then the media reinforce it? Maybe the media are simply 
responding to their audiences? Because of the unanswered causality, some scholars 
lamented that agenda-setting may be an apt metaphor, but it is no theory. 
 It is important, however, not to judge the utility of the agenda-setting approach 
based on the earliest studies. Although these had many limitations, they have inspired 
other research that is providing intriguing if still controversial results. For example, some 
researchers have attempted to overcome the causality questioning by conducting research 
with an experimental approach, which is commonly agreed to prove causality. 
Longitudinal panel analysis is another approach to overcome the causality questioning. 
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 Agenda-setting is a fascinating idea, and it has attracted a tremendous amount of 
research attention. It was estimated more than a decade ago that about 25 agenda-setting 
studies appeared annually (Dearing & Rogers, 1996), and since then, even more studies 
in this research stream have been published each year. However, most of the hundreds of 
agenda-setting studies have a made-in-the-U.S.A. label, comparing American people’s 
public opinions with American media agendas. As more and more evidence accumulated 
about the agenda-setting influence of the mass media on the public in the U.S., some 
scholars began to ask instead, is such an agenda-setting pattern specific to America? 
What about other countries? Do agenda-setting effects exist in diverse cultural settings? 
Is the agenda-setting process in other countries different from the process in the U.S.? Is 
it similar? Or is it in sharp contrast? 
Agenda-Setting in Other Countries/Regions 
 Agenda-setting studies conducted either in other countries, or using data from 
other countries, generally are influenced by the American agenda-setting research 
approaches. Studies have been carried out in Argentina (Lennon, 1998; Pereson, 2002), 
Australia (Gadir, 1982), Canada (Winter et al., 1982), Denmark (Siune & Borre, 1975), 
Germany (Kepplinger et al., 1989; Schoenback & Semetko, 1992), Ghana (Anokwa & 
Salwen, 1988), Israel (Caspi, 1982), Japan (Mikami et al., 1994; Ogawa, 2001; Takeshita, 
1993, 2002; Takeshita & Mikami, 1995), Saudi Arabia (Al-Haqeel & Melkote, 1994), 
Singapore (Holaday & Kuo, 1992), South Korea (Lim, 2006), Spain (Berganza & Martin, 
1997; Lopez-Escobar et al., 1998a; Lopez-Escobar et al., 1998b; McCombs et al., 1997; 
McCombs et al., 2000; Sanchez-Aranda et al., 1997), Sweden (Asp, 1983), Taiwan 
(King, 1994, 1997), Venezuela (1975), and maybe elsewhere. Although dealing with 
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varied countries, these foreign studies have certain aspects in common, one of which is 
that they follow the American agenda-setting paradigm in observing the agenda-setting 
process in the target country or countries on either the first level or the second level, or 
both, and compare the results with those found in American studies. 
Latin America 
 In Argentina, evidence of significant agenda-setting effects was found during the 
1997 legislative elections in the Buenos Aires metropolitan area (Lennon, 1998). In 
September of the year, the correlation for the top four issues of the day was weak (-0.20) 
between the public agenda and the combined issue agenda for the five major Buenos 
Aires newspapers. As Election Day approached in October, however, the correspondence 
between these agendas for the most important issues soared to +0.80, an increase that 
indicates considerable acquisition from the news media in the closing weeks of the 
election campaign. Additional evidence of agenda-setting effects was also found during 
the 1998 Argentina primary election held to select the presidential candidate for a major 
political coalition (Pereson, 2002) – for the six most significant issues of the day, the 
correspondence between the public agenda at the time of the election and the newspaper 
agenda of the previous month was +0.60; for television news, the correspondence was 
even stronger (+0.71). 
Europe 
 Intending to test both the first- and second-level agenda-setting effects, Lopez-
Escobar et al. (1998a) used data from the 1995 Spanish regional elections to explore two 
sets of hypotheses: An increment in media use for political information corresponds to 1) 
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an increment in community consensus about social priorities, and 2) an increment in 
community consensus about politicians’ attributes. The analysis of the first-level effects, 
which largely replicates the study conducted in North Carolina, U.S., shows that a trend 
toward consensus in an agenda of issues is also present among the Spanish public. 
Analysis of the second-level effects shows that the pattern of increasing social consensus 
is also present. 
At the second level of agenda-setting, there is evidence, also from the 1995 local 
elections in the Spanish province of Navarra, that political advertisements influenced the 
subsequent depiction of the candidates on television news (Lopez-Escobar et al., 1998b). 
The primary influence of the advertising was on depictions of the candidates’ 
qualifications. On television, the time devoted to qualifications increased more than 
eightfold from the early days of the campaign to the latter days. One other aspect of the 
agenda-setting process is the intermedia agenda-setting, which is the interactions and 
influence of the various mass media on each other. This study found strong evidence of 
intermedia agenda-setting – comparisons of the coverage on six local issues in two 
Pamplona newspapers yielded strong correlations with the subsequent television news 
agenda. This intermedia agenda-setting pattern is highly similar to the pattern in Roberts’ 
and McCombs’ (1994) Austin, Texas study during the 1990 gubernatorial campaign, 
which found that the issue agenda of the local daily newspaper influenced the issue 
agenda of local television news. 
The existence of agenda-setting effects in diverse cultural settings is also well 
demonstrated by the extensive evidence gathered during the 1996 Spanish general 
election (McCombs et al., 1997; McCombs et al., 2000). Among voters in Pamplona, 
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Spain, there was evidence of significant influence by the major news and advertising 
media on the images of the three candidates. Comparisons of the voters’ pictures of the 
candidates with the descriptions of the candidates in the various mass media yielded 
striking results: All the correlations were significantly positive, among which the 
correlations between the voters’ agenda of attributes and the attribute agenda of the 
newspapers, both local and national, are especially highly significant. Additional analyses 
(Berganza & Martin, 1997; Sanchez-Aranda et al., 1997) found that, along with increased 
exposure to newspapers, television news and political advertising, there were increases in 
both positive appraisals of other candidates and negative appraisals of one’s preferred 
candidates, which suggested that voters did learn from the media. 
In Germany, a longitudinal agenda-setting study (Kepplinger et al., 1989) found 
that the tone of the news about politician Helmut Kohl in news magazines and major 
newspapers influenced public opinion between 1975 and 1984 about his political 
performance, first as a leader of the opposition party and later as a chancellor. Shifting 
patterns of positive and negative tone in the media, summed across six attributes of Kohl, 
explained significant shifts in his level of approval among the German public. The 
median correlation between the affective tone of the attribute agendas for six major news 
media and subsequent public opinion was +0.48. 
A dramatically different result of a compelling argument, however, was found 
during the 1990 German national election, where the salience of problems in the former 
East Germany significantly declined among voters despite intensive news coverage 
(Schoenback & Semetko, 1992). An agenda-deflating effect was especially apparent 
among readers of the large circulation tabloid Bild, whose converge of the integration of 
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East Germany was framed in highly optimistic terms. In this case, the conclusive 
argument was the positive tone of the news coverage on the issue of German integration, 
an attribute that reduced the salience of the issue on the public agenda. 
Middle East 
 In Israel, Caspi’s (1982) study found that the agenda of questions posed to 
government ministers by Knesset members reflected the agenda-setting influence of the 
newspapers – the number of questions grounded in news reports steadily increased from 
8% in the inaugural 1949-1951 Knesset to 55% in the 1969-1973 seventh session.  
South/East Asia 
 In the initial Chapel Hill study, the median correlation among the issue agendas of 
the five daily newspapers (a mix of local and elite dailies) and two television networks 
observed was highly significant (+0.81), an apparent indication of intermedia agenda-
setting. King’s (1994) Taiwan study had a similar comparison of the issue agendas for 
three major daily newspapers and three television stations in Taipei during the 1992 
Taiwan legislative elections. It found a median intermedia correlation that was also 
highly significant (+0.75). King’s (1997) later study compared the attribute agendas in 
the major Taipei newspapers for three mayoral candidates, also finding strong 
correlations among them (median correlation +0.93). 
 In Japan, a wealth of agenda-setting research has been conducted since the early 
1990s. Takeshita (1993) studied the agenda-setting process in a 1986 Japanese mayoral 
election. Voters in Machida City, a municipality in the Tokyo metropolitan area, regarded 
welfare policies, urban facilities and local taxes as the three most import issues in the 
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election. Comparison of the public agenda, which had seven issues in total, with the 
coverage of the four major newspapers serving Machida City yielded a modest, but 
significant, correlation of +0.39. The influence of news in a major Japanese daily 
newspaper also was found apparent in the pattern of concerns among residents of Tokyo 
about global environmental problems (Mikami et al., 1994). Among Tokyo residents, the 
media attribute agendas resulted in significant learning: Their agenda of sub-issues about 
the global environment showed substantial agreement with the emerging agenda of the 
two newspapers during the months leading up to the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (UNCED) held in June 1992.  
The 1993 Japanese general election also demonstrated the validity of agenda-
setting theory across cultures as well as at two distinct levels of cognition; both the first 
and second levels of agenda-setting were simultaneously examined (Takeshita & 
Mikami, 1995). Beginning with traditional agenda-setting, the influence of intensive 
news coverage was examined on the salience of political reform, an issue that accounted 
for more than 80% of the issue coverage in two major national newspapers and three TV 
networks. Moving on to the second level of agenda-setting, the salience of system-related 
aspects of reform on the public agenda was found positively related with attentiveness to 
political news, and this was the aspect of the issue, its attribute, emphasized in the news. 
On the other hand, since the ethics-related aspects and their attributes of political reform 
received minor attention in the news, there was little relationship between the salience of 
the ethics-related aspects of reform on the public agenda and attentiveness to political 
news. 
In a second level agenda-setting experiment conducted in Japan (Ogawa, 2001), 
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the effects of object salience in the media were demonstrated in the amount of change 
found for three behaviors (“want to discuss the issue,” “want more information on the 
issue,” and “greater interest in the issue”) related to each subject’s lowest-priority issue 
among the four unobtrusive issues measured. Half of the subjects enrolled in the 
experiment read articles about their lowest-priority issue that contained only bare facts 
(the typical objective style employed by journalists for spot news). The other half read 
interpretative articles about their lowest-priority issue that forecast the impact of the issue 
on the reader. Consistently greater change in the three behaviors was found among 
subjects reading the interpretative news articles. 
A content analysis of the Mainichi Shimbun during a 52-week period identified 12 
distinct aspects or attributes of Japan’s economic difficulties in the news coverage 
(Takeshita, 2002). Placing these attributes in the context of problematic situations, a 
survey of the public asked how problematic they regarded each of the 12 aspects. The 
attribute agenda-setting effects of the newspaper’s coverage of the economy was tested 
both at the level of lower-order attributes, the 12 aspects of the issue, and at the macro-
level of frames, the four problematic situations. At both levels, the degree of 
correspondence between the newspaper’s agenda and the public’s agenda increased 
monotonically with greater exposure to the news. In this analysis of Japanese public 
opinion, there are agenda-setting effects for both micro- and macro-attributes. 
Intermedia Agenda-Setting 
The area of research usually referred to as “intermedia agenda-setting” deals with 
the influence that mass media agendas have on each other, which concerns how media 
agendas are being shaped, instead of how they are shaping the public’s agenda. That is, if 
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one medium publishes its stories, other media will mirror that medium’s content and deal 
with the content in their publications as importantly as in the original medium.  
Previous research has documented empirical evidence for this process of 
intermedia agenda-setting (eg. King, 1994; King, 1997; Lim, 2006; Lopez-Escobar et al., 
1998b; McCombs & Shaw, 1972; Reese & Danielian, 1989; Takeshita, 2002). In general, 
at the national level, high status news organizations, such as The New York Times and 
Associated Press, set the agendas of other news organizations; at the local level, local 
newspapers and television stations influence the news agenda of their competitors. 
In a study of how 24 Iowa daily newspapers used the Associated Press (AP), Gold 
and Simmons (1965) found an overall coefficient of correspondence of +.915, indicating 
that local news agendas were strongly influenced by wire service reports. Although each 
local newspaper used only a small number of the wire stories available, their coverage 
reflected the same proportions for each category of news as did the wire reports. In the 
line of such media effects, Whitney and Becker (1982) showed the wire service’s 
influence on local media’s agenda, with a correlation coefficient of +.71 between the 
number of items transmitted by the wire service and the number of stories selected from 
each category of news . Wire services’ effect on other media can be traced back to the 
classical White’s (1950) gatekeeper study. Breed (1955) also showed such effects of the 
wire services’ agenda and pointed out the trends of local media’s standardization of news 
stories.  
The effects were not limited to the wire services. Other major or elite news 
organizations, such as The New York Times and The Washington Post, also influence the 
selection of topics on the news agenda. For example, Reese and Danielian (1989) 
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identified The New York Times’ agenda-setting role by illustrating that the NYT’s 
coverage on the drug issue was followed by The Washington Post and The Los Angeles 
Times. Some television networks also followed the NYT issues.  
This intermedia influence can be found both among news organizations and 
individual journalists. Constantly, journalists are in a position to cover ambiguous issues. 
They thus tend to rely on each other for ideas and confirmation of their news judgments. 
Editors tend to question coverage that differs from other news sources, so journalists seek 
consistency and conformity in their reporting of events. This phenomenon, known as 
pack journalism, was observed by Crouse (1973) during the 1972 presidential campaign: 
“What happened was that Johnny Apple of The New York Times sat in a corner 
and everyone peered over his shoulder to find out what he was writing. The AP 
guy was looking over one shoulder, the UPI guy over the other and CBS, NBC, 
ABC, and the Baltimore Sun were all crowding in behind…He would sit down 
and write a lead, and they would go write leads…Finally, at midnight, the guy 
announced that Muskie had 32 percent and McGovern had 26 percent, and Apple 
sat down to write his final story. He called it something like ‘a surprisingly strong 
showing for George McGovern.’ Everyone peered over his shoulder again and 
picked it up. It was on the front page of every major newspaper the next day” 
(Crouse, 1973, pp.84-85). 
 
Similar situations occur outside the parameter of a presidential campaign. 
Prichard (1987) described how a December 1982 story about a man attempting to blow 
up the Washington Monument was stuck at page 1A of USA Today until Dan Rather led 
with it on the “CBS Evening News.” By appearing on a major network, the story had 
been given a “verification factor.” Haws (1993) also observed The New York Times’ 
decision to identify William Kennedy Smith’s alleged rape victim. The Times had 
identified Patricia Bowman in an article published on April 17, 1991. In the news story, 
the Times explained that it normally withheld the names of alleged sexual assault victims, 
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but since NBC had identified Bowman the night before, it no longer felt responsible for 
protecting her privacy. The identification of Bowman was deemed legitimate by the 
Times because another news organization had previously named her. 
The intermedia agenda-setting process has also been examined in countries 
outside the U.S. In Spain, an examination of intermedia influence among newspapers and 
television during the 1995 local elections measured both first- and second-level agenda-
setting effects (Lopez-Escobar et al., 1998b). Intermedia agenda-setting at the first level 
was found significant. At the second level, for substantive attributes, newspaper political 
advertising influenced both the newspaper and television news agendas, whereas TV 
news in turn influenced the TV political advertising agenda; for affective attributes, the 
intermedia relationships are largely reciprocal. In Taiwan, a comparison of the issue 
agendas for three major daily newspapers and three television stations in Taipei during 
the 1992 Taiwan legislative elections found a median correlation of +0.75 (King, 1994). 
A comparison of the attribute agendas in the major Taipei newspapers for three mayoral 
candidates found a median correlations of +0.93 (King, 1997). In Japan, the framing of 
economic problem by two major newspapers was compared for two sets of attributes – 
problematic situation frames and sub-issue frames – and across two different time periods 
– 26 weeks and 52 weeks (Takeshita, 2002). The median correlation for these four 
comparisons fell between +0.72 and +0.73. Most recently, Lim (2006) examined the 
causal relationships among the issue agendas of three online news media in South Korea 
during two time periods, finding that the leading online newspaper influenced the issue 
agendas of both the secondary online newspaper and the online wire service. 
Originally, the idea of exchanging influence among the media came from simple 
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curiosity – if media set the public agenda, then who sets the media agenda? As more and 
more evidence accumulated about the agenda-setting influence of the mass media on the 
public, scholars in the early 1980s began to instead ask the question of “who sets the 
media’s agenda.” To distinguish this first phase (media agenda as effect) of the agenda-
setting process from the second phase (media agenda as cause), some scholars call it 
“building the media’s agenda” or “shaping the media’s agenda” (McCombs, 2004). 
Agenda building, or agenda-shaping, is concerned with influences on the media agenda.  
The expansion of the parameters of agenda-setting research from the question of 
who sets the public agenda to that of who sets the media agenda has resulted in three 
major areas – media agenda-setting, public agenda-setting, and policy agenda-setting 
studies (McCombs & Shaw, 1993). While some prominent scholars identified the sources 
of the media agenda in various ways (Funkhouser, 1973; Shoemaker & Reese, 1996), 
intermedia agenda-setting studies examine mainly the relationships among different 
media, attributing the source of the media agenda to other media. But it still opens the 
door to potential news agenda makers like politicians, PR, and other influential forces, in 
order to expand the theoretical territory of the agenda setting effects on the media. 
According to McCombs (2004), the interactions among news organizations, or intermedia 
agenda-setting, is one of the three key elements to shape the media’s agenda, the other 
two of which are news sources and news norms, which will be discussed in a global 
context in the following section.  
Global News Determinants (Media Agenda Shapers)  
McCombs (2004) uses an “onion” metaphor to illustrate who might set the 
media’s agenda (see Figure 2-1). At the core of the onion is the media agenda; the 
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concentric layers of the onion represent the numerous influences at play in the shaping of 
the media agenda. As McCombs identifies, there are three fundamental layers: the layer 
immediately surrounding the core is news norms, such as social norms and traditions of 
journalism; the intermediate layer is the other news media, such as the interactions and 
influence of the various mass media on each other; and the outer layer of the theoretical 
onion is news sources, such as the president of the U.S., routine public relations 
activities, and the efforts of political campaigns.  
International communication researchers have explored media agenda-shapers in 
an international context. Most of these studies adopted quantitative methods to examine 
various factors that influence international news flow across national borders, although 
there also are a number of studies that employed qualitative methods to uncover 
determinants of news coverage. This line of research, originated in the 1960s by a 
handful of Scandinavian scholars, is usually called “international news determinants,” 
which, as in the theoretical framework of agenda-setting, can be called media agenda-
shapers. These systemic determinants, as Wu (1998, 2000, 2003) calls them, can be fit 
into either the “news sources” or the “news norms” layers in McCombs’ metaphoric 
onion.  
As Ahern (1984) and Wu (1998, 2000, 2003) agreed, determinants of 
international news flow can be divided into two broad categories, gatekeeper perspective 
and logistical perspective. The former category generally centers on news norms, that is, 
the social psychology of the news professionals and how those characteristics eventually 
affect news output; the latter category, which examines the socioeconomic components 
and physical logistics of news gathering, generally focuses on news sources. With regards 
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to the gatekeeper factors, traditional newsworthiness, sociocultural structure and 
organizational constraints over news professionals and the agenda-setting impact of 
international news services have all been found to influence international news flow. On 
the other hand, the influential factors included in the logistical group are: The GNP of 
each nation, population, geographic size, eliteness, communication resources and 
infrastructure, volume of trade, regionalism, geographic proximity, political/economic 
interests of host countries, and cultural proximity. 
News Norms (Gatekeeper Perspective) 
 News professionals and international news agencies play an important role in the 
gatekeeping effect on international news coverage. They can either decide the amount of 
coverage a country receives or determine the topics or issues that will be emphasized if a 
particular country is covered at all. According to various studies, news editors tend to 
either neglect or belittle the audience’s interests in international news. In addition, news 
people often seem to hold peculiar perceptions about their readers’ needs, and even 
disregard results of empirical audience research. For example, both Schramm (1960) and 
Hester (1971) found that news editors tend to act on their intuitive assumptions about 
readers – they often believe that most readers are only interested in the countries where 
there exist cultural or ethnic ties rather than those that are entirely unrelated. Chang and 
Lee (1992) found that American editors’ criteria of selection are, in effect, related to their 
backgrounds, such as foreign language training, professional education, political ideology 
and availability of news hole and wire services. To ascertain international news values 
held by American journalists, Chang et al. (1987) compared the events in 1984 and news 
coverage of the same year, finding that deviance of the event, relevance to the US, 
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potential for social change and geographical distance were the factors that distinguished 
the events that were covered and those that were not. This study is in line with the earlier 
research of Shoemaker et al. (1986), which suggested “deviance” as an underlying 
construct of newsworthiness. 
 International communication scholars (e.g., Hachten & Scotton, 2002; Hachten & 
Scotton, 2007; Stevenson, 1994) are often struck by how differently journalism is 
practiced in different parts of the world. They constructed “normative concepts” of press 
systems, just to highlight the special features and to help distinguish the underlying 
elements among them. Haynes (1984), however, pointed out that there exists an 
overwhelming similarity of international news with regard to topic selection – political 
relationships between nations and domestic politics occurring in foreign countries are the 
primary focuses of foreign news across the spectrum of the world’s journalism. Another 
primary focus is “bad news.” Regardless of the various definitions of “bad news,” studies 
dealing with this research agenda resulted in complex findings. Some (e.g., Stevenson & 
Gaddy, 1984) suggest that the Third World or developing countries indeed receive 
heavier coverage of bad news, others (e.g., Cooper, 1984; Pal, 1993) found that the Third 
World countries are no more likely than their Western counterparts to be covered on 
“coups and earthquakes” – media generally tend to produce “bad news”; there does not 
appear to be a significant difference between from the West and from the Third World. 
In addition to the influence of individual gatekeepers and their preference for 
certain news values on international news, some scholars have argued that the forces 
acting upon news professionals, such as organizational constraints and cultural customs, 
also affect news selection, perhaps to a greater extent than those much studied 
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psychological mechanisms at the personal level. Johnson (1997) suggests that, despite the 
importance of news values, individual reporters’ efforts, and the ideological framework 
in which the journalists operate, news organizational and market determinants are 
influential and should be focused on. Johnson even dissected the organization factors 
from the general gatekeeper category to form two new independent categories of 
determinants: news organization factors (including variables specific to the news 
organization, such as size, profitability, number of foreign editors, number of wire 
services available) and news organization market (audience in the community in which a 
typical newspaper operates, e.g., percentage of Mexican-Americans in a particular 
newspaper’s market). Johnson found in her 1997 news flow study that the percentage of 
the population having a Mexican heritage (news organization market) and circulation size 
(news organization factor) the strongest predictors of coverage of Mexico, and circulation 
size was the sole predictor of length and source of articles about Mexico and Mexicans.  
News Sources (Logistical Perspective) 
 Research in this line generally deals with determinants that fit into one of the 
following three sub-categories: 
1. National traits 
 Studies that tested the influence of national traits on news flow generally stem 
from Galtung’s & Ruge’s (1965) seminal work, which presented a structural theory of 
foreign news. Ostgaard’s (1965) and Galtung’s (1971) works, are also among the most 
frequently cited literature in this research stream. As a conceptual framework, their 
theory claims that economic, social, political and geographic characteristics of nations 
determine the amount and the nature of coverage one country receives in another 
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country’s news media. Putting the structural theory to test, Rosengren (1977) discovered 
factors such as trade and population affect the volume of news a nation receives, yet the 
explicability of each factor varies across countries. Ahern (1984) found that trade and 
GNP together with international relations account for almost 60% of the variance in 
predicting the number of news stories published. In a similar vein, Wu (1998, 2000, 
2003) and Pietilainen (2006) found that the trade between nations was one of the most 
conducive factors in augmenting press coverage in foreign countries. The “trade” and 
“international relations” factors can actually be classified to the next sub-category, 
interactions and relatedness. 
2. Interactions and relatedness 
  Nnaemeka and Richstad (1980) surveyed 19 newspapers of the Pacific region and 
found that the nations having a colonial tie are given more news attention within the same 
colonial group. Echoing this study’s finding, several subsequent studies also found old 
colonial ties to be important factors in determining the volume of news flow. For 
example, in Atwood’s (1985) study, findings indicated that African and Arab countries 
tended to get covered with more stories in the press of the same colonial group. 
Language was found to be another decisive element among the interactions and 
relatedness factors. For example, Kariel and Rosenvall (1983) found that French-
language and English-language newspapers fall into distinctly separate groups. 
 There are also a number of studies addressing the influence of regionalism or 
geographic proximity on news selection, suggesting that both factors contribute to 
international news presentation. 
3. Communication infrastructure 
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 The extent to which a country is equipped with sufficient communication 
infrastructure and human resources in collecting and processing international news is 
usually defined as a logistical factor. Findings on this factor are mixed. Larson’s (1979) 
seminal study found that international news wire is the most important factor, followed 
by the presence of an national news agency. Years later, with updated data added to the 
original sample,  Larson (1984) did not find evidence to support the original conclusion 
about the prediction of satellite communication facilities, although the other two factors 
were found to significantly influence newscasts - location of U.S. network bureaus and 
the presence of international news agency in the nation. The presence of international 
news agencies also appeared to be one of the two principle predictors in Wu’s (2000) 38-
country comparison study. 
From previous studies, one can observe that few, if any, international 
communication theories have been developed from this body of literature accumulated in 
the past few decades due to varied media samples, time frames, key definitions, analytical 
methods and operationalizations of variables in each study. Apparently, a systematic and 
across-the-board examination of the existing variables, and perhaps some new ones, is 
needed in the future. It is also observed that most of the previous international news 
determinants studies focused on news norms and news sources perspectives. Little 
research, if any, has paid attention to the international intermedia agenda-setting process, 
as is called “interactions and influence of various media on each other” layer in 
McCombs’ metaphoric “onion.” Based on recent developments and changes in the news 
environment and in technology worldwide, a global survey would be timely to explore 
the international intermedia agenda-setting process. 
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Global Media Systems 
As noted earlier, international communication scholars (e.g., Hachten & Scotton, 
2002; Hachten & Scotton, 2007; Stevenson, 1994) are often struck by how differently 
journalism is practiced in different parts of the world. They thus constructed “normative 
concepts” of press systems, just to highlight the special features and to help distinguish 
the underlying elements among them. These concepts, as Hachten and Scotton (2007) call 
them, reflect the varied ideologies of press control worldwide. 
According to Hachten and Scotton (2007), there are five different country-level 
media systems. However, it is important to note that no country falls perfectly under one 
concept. These concepts reflect how the media ideally should perform under certain 
political conditions and social values.3 
The Authoritarian concept is the oldest and most pervasive of the five. In this 
concept, the press is always subject to direct or implied control by the state or sovereign. 
In the traditional sense, the press operates outside of the government and is allowed to 
gather and publish news but it must function for “the good of the state.”  The press 
functions from the top down in these systems- the king declares what is newsworthy 
because truth and information are a monopoly of those in power. Diversity of views is 
considered wasteful and dissent is annoying. Some examples of nations with an 
Authoritarian media system are Kenya, Pakistan, Burma, Libya and South Asian nations 
such as Singapore, Malaysia and Indonesia. It is also possible for democratic nations to 
have an authoritarian press under certain conditions such as war or terrorist attacks.  
Another media concept is Communist, which is a modification of the 
                                            
3 Also see Siebert, F. S., Peterson, T. & Schramm W. (1963). Four theories of the press. 
Champaign, IL: University of Illinois Press.   
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Authoritarian. In Communist media systems, the media are not privately owned (as in the 
Authoritarian) but are part of the government. The press is believed to serve the positive 
functions for society by socialization to desired norms. Communist systems are free from 
a profit motive because they only transmit official views and policies. They mobilize 
support for nation building, but the fatal flaw of the Communist system is that it serves 
the party but not the people. Examples of this press concept can be seen in Cuba, North 
Korea, China, Laos, and Vietnam. Often these communist systems face rebellion by the 
people who listen to outside media broadcasts (such as the BBC and VOA).  
The Revolutionary media concept is of a press of people who believe strongly that 
their government doesn’t serve their interests and should be overthrown. They feel no 
loyalty to the ruling government. The concept of illegal and subversive underground 
communication using press and broadcasting is difficult to find pure examples of, yet the 
Iran cassette tape revolution fits well. More than 1,000 tapes were broadcast from 
mosques that had speeches with revolutionary messages. After a successful rebellion and 
overthrow of power, revolutionary media become developmental. 
The Developmental concept is not clearly defined. It can be seen as a variation of 
the authoritarian concept because the main goal of the media is nation building.  It 
combines national integration with economic development but pays little attention to 
personal freedoms of expression because they believe they are irrelevant in the face of 
poverty.  It is traditionally anti-American and is a reaction against the West by the media-
deficient.  This media concept began to lose momentum in the mid 1990s as the Western 
concept and democratization gained popularity.   
Finally, the Western concept is found in Western nations such as the U.S., U.K., 
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Canada, Italy, Spain, and France, among others. The Western concept values the right of 
the press to report on, comment on and criticize the government without retaliation. 
These nations do not consider seditious libel as a crime; they share the characteristics of 
high incomes, education, and literacy levels, healthy market economics, and an 
established tradition of independent journalism. These media are relatively free of 
arbitrary government regulation. 
Today the most viable concepts are Western and Authoritarian, although the 
Western concept continues to be criticized for being sensationalist and profit-oriented. 
Despite the diverse media systems worldwide, Haynes (1984), as noted earlier, pointed 
out that there exists an overwhelming similarity of international news with regard to topic 
selection – political relationships between nations and domestic politics occurring in 
foreign countries are the primary focuses of foreign news across the spectrum of the 
world’s journalism. Among the factors that contribute to this similarity, the Western news 
purveyors play an important role globally. Besides the big news agencies that have long 
been regarded as the world’s media agenda shapers, such as Reuters, AP, and AFP, 
several international newspapers, magazines, and broadcasting organizations are believed 
to be especially important among opinion leaders around the world (Rampal, 1995). 
These include newspapers such as The New York Times, the Times (of U.K.), the 
Guardian (also of U.K.), the International Herald Tribune (based in France), the Wall 
Street Journal, the Financial Times (of London); newsmagazines such as Time, 
Newsweek, and Economist (of U.K.); news broadcasters such as CNN and BBC (of U.K.). 
Among them, the impact of CNN on global communication has been particularly 
extensively researched (Volkmer, 1999). 
 31
 The practices of Western mass communication have been more and more widely 
dispersed and accepted by people worldwide. The September 11 incidents, and later the 
bombings in Madrid and London, as well as the tsunami and hurricanes Katrina and Rita, 
showed the world how crucial it is for professional journalism, signified by Western 
media, to supply reliable and verifiable news to their audience at a time of crisis.  
 Since the fall of the Communist “second” world, the Western concept of 
journalism and mass communication has become the dominant model throughout the 
world and is widely emulated (Hachten & Scotton, 2007). Many non-Western nations 
have adopted not only the logistics of the Western press and broadcasting but also its 
norms, ethical standards and philosophy.  
Hypotheses 
 By and large, previous agenda-setting research conducted in countries outside the 
U.S. has generally found similar agenda-setting patterns in each individual country 
studied as in the U.S. – the links between public concerns and media emphasis. Despite 
the hundreds of agenda-setting publications, however, we are unable to see a universal 
picture of the agenda-setting function of the mass media due to the lack of multinational 
comparison. More research in a wide variety of countries is needed.  
This current study, while asking a traditional agenda-setting research question, 
whether and how the media tell the public what to think about, in other words, if public 
concerns correspond to media emphasis, is able to include multiple countries so that 
comparisons across different cultures are possible and a global picture may be seen. 
Second, previous agenda-setting research on intermedia agenda-setting effects is limited 
to the media outlets of one particular city, area, or country. This study is the first to move 
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beyond this limitation. It explores international intermedia agenda-setting effects with 
multinational agenda data in a context of increased globalization. For example, it asks, do 
American media, as a media superpower, have influences on the agendas of foreign 
media? This is a significant extension of the research on agenda-setting. The extent to 
which media in different countries perceive the same events as significant is an indication 
of how much the media world has become globalized. Along with the rapid progress of 
globalization, international intermedia agenda-setting certainly deserves attention.    
 Based on previous research, the following hypotheses are proposed in this study: 
 H1: There are positive correlations between the public object agendas and media 
object agendas in the countries studied. 
 H2: There are positive international intermedia correlations among the object 
agendas of the media outlets of the countries studied. 
 H3: Western countries’ media have more influence on the object agendas of non-
Western countries’ media than vice versa. 
 H4: Although the object agendas of the media outlets in different countries are 
similar, the attribute agendas are dissimilar (due to different ideologies). 
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Figure 2-1  Who Sets Media’s Agenda: A Metaphorical Onion 
 
 
 
MEDIA 
AGENDA 
News norms 
Social norms; 
traditions of 
journalism 
Other news media 
Interactions and influence 
of various mass media on 
each other  
News sources 
President;  
routine PR activities; 
political campaigns 
 
Source from McCombs (2004)
 34
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                           
CHAPTER 3 
METHOD 
Sampling and Data Sources 
The BBC World Service Poll of 27 countries4 asked respondents about the most 
significant global events in 2005: “In the future, when historians think about the year 
2005, what event of global significance do you think will be seen as most important?” 
The poll was conducted for the BBC World Service by the international polling firm 
GlobeScan together with the Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) at the 
University of Maryland. The 27-nation fieldwork was coordinated by GlobeScan. The 
poll was completed during October, November, and December 2005, with a total sample 
of 32,439 people. The poll involved either face-to-face or telephone surveys in each 
country, with national samples in most countries.5 Respondents in most countries were 
adults of 18 years or older.6 (For survey operationalization details in each of the countries 
studied in this project, see Appendix 1; for more information about the poll, visit 
 
4 Countries surveyed: Afghanistan, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, Congo (DRC), Finland, 
France, Germany, Ghana, Great Britain, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Italy, Kenya, Mexico, Philippines, 
Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sri Lanka, Turkey, USA. 
 
5 Except for Brazil, Philippines, Turkey (urban samples), Indonesia (major metropolitan areas 
sample). 
 
6 Except for Brazil (18-69 years old), Finland (18-79), France (15 or older), Germany (16-70), 
Indonesia (18-60), Saudi Arabia (18-59), South Africa (16 or older), South Korea (19 or older), 
Turkey (15 or older). 
http://www.pipa.org/OnlineReports/Other%20Studies/BBCTopEvent_Dec05/BBCTopEv
ent_Dec05_rpt2.pdf.) 
 In general, according to the PIPA report of the poll, the most common answers for 
the most significant events were the war in Iraq, the Asian tsunami, and hurricanes 
Katrina and Rita in the U.S. The war in Iraq was cited as the most significant event by 
15% worldwide. Not surprisingly, this was especially prominent among Iraqis with 43% 
citing it. It was also relatively high in South Korea (31%), Spain (28%), the US (27%), 
and Turkey (26%). The other most widely mentioned event of 2005 was the Asian 
tsunami, volunteered by 15% worldwide. Not surprisingly, Asia-Pacific countries were 
most likely to cite it - Sri Lanka (57%), Indonesia (31%), Australia (27%), South Korea 
(24%), and the Philippines (21%). The US hurricanes – Katrina and Rita – were cited by 
9% worldwide. While 15% of Americans cited it as the most significant event, larger 
percentages were found in Afghanistan (18%) and Argentina (18%). The death of Pope 
John Paul II and the inauguration of Pope Benedict XVI was the fourth most-widely-cited 
event. Worldwide, 6% mentioned this as the most important event of the year. Much of 
this came from several Catholic countries, where very large percentages cited it, 
especially Poland (48%), but also Italy (17%). Large percentages also cited it in the 
Congo (29%) and Kenya (10%). The London bombings were seen as the most significant 
event by 4% overall. Interestingly, among Britons, only 7% mentioned the London 
bombings, while in Indonesia, 48% mentioned the Bali bombings. The London bombings 
also figured more prominently among Ghanaians (11%) and Australians, South Koreans, 
and the Spanish (8% each) than among the British. Global warming figured prominently 
in the thinking of 3%, who cited the earth’s getting warmer or the international 
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negotiations related to climate change as the most significant event of the year. Concerns 
about global warming were especially high in Mexico (13%), Finland (11%), Great 
Britain (10%), Canada (8%), and India (8%).  
  A remarkable finding of the poll is how similar the assessments were across 
countries (see Figure 3-1-1, 3-1-2, 3-1-3). The top three events cited worldwide were also 
among the three most frequently cited in a large number of countries. As Steven Kull, 
director of PIPA comments, the extent to which people in different countries perceive the 
same events as significant is an indication of how much the world has become globalized. 
 The BBC poll data were used as a measure of the public agenda in each country. 
For media agenda, data were collected from the LexisNexis Academic database. 
 From the 27 surveyed countries, first the seven English-as-official-language 
countries were selected for this study: Australia (AU), Canada (CA), the United Kingdom 
(UK), India (IN), Kenya (KE), the Philippines (PH), and the United States (US).7 With 
the availability of bilingual helpers, the list of investigated countries was then expanded, 
with Spanish-as-official-language countries Argentina (AR), Mexico (MX), Spain (ES), 
and French-as-official-language country France (FR) joining in. As a result, 11 countries 
in six different continents (Asia, Africa, Europe, Latin America, North America, 
Oceania), and newspapers in three different languages, were included in this study. 
Variable Operationalization and Data Collection 
 For each country, the agenda-setting effect analysis involves two major variables: 
Public Agenda (percentage of the public in a particular country that cited a particular 
                                            
7 Ghana and South Africa are not included because their top national dailies were unavailable in 
the LexisNexis database. 
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event as MSE, as reported in the BBC poll), and Media Agenda (frequency of news 
reports on a particular event in major newspapers of a particular country during the year 
of 2005, as returned in the search of LexisNexis Academic database). 
 In the LexisNexis searches, “keyword (MSE) ‘in Headline, Lead paragraph, 
Terms’” was used as search criterion.8 To identify what papers qualify as “major 
newspapers” in a country, first the most recent edition of the World Press Trends (2005), 
published by the World Association of Newspapers, was consulted for a list of top 
national dailies (by circulation). Several scholars and librarians who specialized in the 
area of international communication were also consulted with to further ensure validity. 
As a result, non-mainstream papers that are identified in the World Press Trends as top 
papers because of large circulations were excluded. For instance, The Sun is the number-
one circulated paper in the U.K., but it was not included in the study because it is a 
tabloid. Thirdly, which newspaper(s) to include in the search was decided in accordance 
with availability in the LexisNexis database. For example, if a country’s top national 
daily is not included in the database, the second paper, if available in the database, was 
considered. And so on and so forth. As a balanced result, the following newspapers are 
included in the searches for media agendas: Herald Sun, The Daily Telegraph (Australia); 
The Toronto Star (Canada); The Daily Telegraph, The Guardian (United Kingdom); The 
Times of India, Hindustan Times (India); The East African (Kenya); Philippine Daily 
Inquirer (Philippines); USA Today, The New York Times (United States); La Nacion 
                                            
8 For Mexico and Argentina, because only one top national daily of each country was available in 
the LexisNexis database and the searches using this criterion returned a very limited number of 
news reports for each object (most fewer than 4 for the entire year), we expanded the searches 
using “in full text” instead. 
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(Argentina); El Universal (Mexico); El Pais, El Mundo (Spain); Le Figaro, L’Equipe 
(France). 
 The Public Agenda (percentage) and Media Agenda (frequency) data collected 
were entered to SPSS 12.0 for statistical analysis. (For a complete listing of the object 
agenda data, see Appendix 2.) Correlation tests were conducted to observe the 
relationship between the public object agendas and media object agendas in each country, 
and international intermedia agenda-setting effects. 
Cross-Lagged Correlation Analyses for Causal Relationships 
 Traditionally, agenda-setting theory hypothesizes that the agenda-setting function 
of news media causes the correlation between the media and public ordering of priorities. 
Over the years, the major criticism of agenda-setting research has been that correlation 
itself does not prove causation.9 To overcome such a weakness, this current study 
employs the cross-lagged correlation technique to explore the directional causality of 
international intermedia agenda-setting process. The validity of this cross-lagged 
correlation method is justified by a few recent agenda-setting publications, including 
Roberts and McCombs (1994), King (1994), Lopez-Escobar, et al. (1998b), and Lim 
(2006). 
 The cross-lagged correlation technique was first suggested by Campbell (1963) as 
a method of studying mutual effects with continuous variables. It can be used to 
                                            
9 Some scholars suggest replacing correlation method with regression, which may result in more 
interpretable information, including unstandardized coefficient, or “raw b,” as an indication of 
effect size, or “efficiency.” Many media effects studies do not produce or report raw b, which, 
when proper care was taken with scale construction, can actually provide unique and important 
information about media efficiency that no other statistical indicator offers. For more information 
on unstandardized coefficient, see Zhao, X. (1997). Conceptual components of media effects and 
their regression indicators. Paper presented at the Association for Education in Journalism and 
Mass Communication, Chicago, Illinois. 
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investigate causal relations without experimental manipulation (Rozelle & Campbell, 
1969). True experiments control for spurious causal relations by random assignment to 
treatment groups, thus guaranteeing that there is no systematic relation between the 
dependent variable and the treatment. The cross-lagged approach investigates causality in 
the absence of a true experiment design, but in a passive manner – that is, instead of 
addressing the traditional causal question of whether X causes Y, the cross-lagged 
analysis examines which is the predominant cause-effect direction. Figure3-2 depicts the 
model. Two variables, X and Y, are measured at two points of time, Time 1 and Time 2. 
Six correlations can then be computed as illustration in Figure 3-2. The synchronous 
correlations, RX1Y1 and RX2Y2, refer to those typically obtained in static correlation 
studies. Correlations between the same variable at different points in time, RX1X2 and 
RY1Y2, are referred to as auto-correlations. The causal analysis focuses on a comparison of 
the two cross-lagged correlations, RX1Y2 and RY1X2. A cross-lagged analysis uses the 
following reasoning: If X has a stronger effect on Y than vice versa, then the correlation 
between Xt1 and Yt2 (RX1Y2), should be greater than the correlation between Yt1 and Xt2 
(RY1X2).  
H3 is a directional hypothesis, in other words, regarding cause and effect. To test 
H3, a series of cross-lagged correlation analyses were conducted using object agendas of 
the multiple countries’ media. Cross-lagged correlations offer two advantages for 
hypothesis-testing. First, two competing hypotheses are examined simultaneously: X 
causes Y and Y causes X. Furthermore, both of these hypotheses can be assessed by the 
Rozelle-Campbell Baseline, the level of correlation to be expected on the basis of the 
autocorrelations and synchronous correlations alone. 
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 To obtain media agenda data in different countries at two time points,10 first 
“Time 1” was defined as the first week of the first occurrence of the event, and “Time 2” 
as the second week.11 Due to practical reasons, those year(s) long global topics, such as 
“war in Iraq”, “global warming”, and “avian flu,” were excluded. As a result, “Asian 
tsunami (12/26/2004)”, “US hurricanes (8/29/2005)”, “death of pope (4/2/2005)”, 
“London bombings (7/7/2005)”, “Bali Bombings (10/1/2005)”, and “Pakistan Earthquake 
(10/8/2005)” are the remaining six MSEs included in this cross-lagged analysis to test 
H3. The numbers of news reports on a particular event in the major newspapers of a 
particular country at Time 1 and Time 2 were then collected respectively, as returned in 
the search of LexisNexis Academic database. A series of cross-lagged correlation tests 
were conducted to detect causal directions among the countries. 
Diction Semantics Analysis: Second-Level Agenda-Setting 
To test H4, the linguistic analysis capability of Diction text-analysis software was 
used to identify similarities and differences in the words of the media reporting of the 
global events in different countries. The advantage of this over traditional content 
analysis is that the method is more reliable, and more objective, because it avoids human 
coding errors and biases. The advantage and validity of this Diction method are justified 
                                            
10 Some scholars suggest one more time point in order to rule out spurious causal relationships. 
This study adopts the tradition in agenda-setting research that uses two time points. 
 
11 Research literature (Winter & Eyal, 1981) suggests that the optimal time span for observing 
agenda-setting effects is four weeks or more, which applies primarily to the process from media 
to public. Literature (Riffe et al., 1993) also suggests the superiority of constructed week sampling 
over simple random and consecutive day samples of newspaper content. Since this study 
involves “events,” (rather than “issues”) which started mostly as breaking news, and examines the 
agenda-setting process from media to media, constructed week sampling does not serve the 
research purpose, and a four week period could be too long to capture media response. This 
study adopts Lopez-Escobar et al.‘s (1998b) sampling method, which is two consecutive weeks of 
the target period. To set a time frame for sampling that is practical requires a certain amount of 
arbitrariness anyway, and there is no great harm in simplifying this way. 
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by and its capabilities are utilized in a number of recent media content studies, including 
Shanahan (2000), Royal (2003), Carroll (2004), Hart and Childers (2005), and Huffaker 
and Calvert (2005). 
Admittedly, computerized content analysis has to face challenges regarding its 
certain aspects, the biggest one among which is its validity. Diction program’s founder 
Roderick Hart once discussed his experience dealing with what he called “stereotypes” 
about computerized content analysis: 
“I have found virtually every stereotype about computerized content analysis to 
be untrue. It is allegedly to be mechanical, but I have found it creative. It has been 
decried as oafish, but I am fascinated by its subtlety. It is said to be reliable but 
not valid, and yet I see its validity as its greatest strength. It is said to be reactive, 
colorless, and arcane; I have found it to be heuristic, exciting, and altogether 
normal. I have reached these conclusions after tinkering with computerized 
language analysis since 1968. Since I began these studies, enormous strides have 
been made in the area…Moving from the first version of Diction to the most 
recent version has…taken a considerable amount of time. The slow course of that 
development…has given me ample opportunity to reflect on the program’s 
theoretical assumptions…I have become increasingly comfortable with those 
assumptions. Accordingly, I use this opportunity to lay out Diction’s unique 
features, to expose how it does what it does, and to show why such matters seem 
important.” (Hart, 2001, p. 44). 
 
Regarding the advantages of computerized content analysis, Hart (2001) contends 
that, if properly coached, computers can detect continuities and discontinuities, can track 
associations across semantic space, note situational changes, distinguish the characteristic 
word choices of one person from those of another; can also detect stabilities in language 
behavior, and so can explain, for example, why Ronald Reagan was both traditional and 
radical, why Richard Nixon declaimed during Vietnam but minced during Watergate. 
Diction 5.0 is a Windows-based program that uses a series of dictionaries to 
search a text passage for semantic features. Diction’s five overall measures, also called 
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master variables, Activity, Optimism, Certainty, Realism and Commonality, are composed 
by standardizing all previous scores, combining them via addition and subtraction, and 
then by adding a constant of 50 to eliminate negative numbers. According to Diction 5.0 
Users Manual, these five measures provide the most general understanding of a given 
text. The five dimensions or master variables are derived from a variety of intellectual 
sources ranging from John Dewey to Wendell Johnson to James David Barber. “Diction 
is indebted to a number of important social thinkers,” according to Hart (2001, p .45), 
“but, because it is a quantitative tool, it is at best an imperfect approximation of their 
ideas.” The five dimensions or master variables, as claimed by Hart, represent the most 
robust understanding of the semantic content. The five master variables, in brief 
description of each, are:    
Activity:  language featuring movement, change, the implementation of ideas, or 
the avoidance of inertia. The formula for certainty is:  (Aggression + Accomplishment + 
Communication + Motion) – (Cognitive Terms + Passivity + Embellishment). 
Optimism:  language endorsing some person, group, concept, or event, or 
highlighting their positive entailments. The formula for certainty is:  (Praise + 
Satisfaction + Inspiration) – (Blame + Hardship + Denial). 
Certainty:  language indicating resoluteness, inflexibility, completeness, and a 
tendency to speak ex cathedra. The formula for certainty is:  (Tenacity + Leveling + 
Collectives + Insistence) – (Numerical Terms + Ambivalence + Self-reference + 
Variety). 
   Realism:  language describing tangible, immediate, recognizable matters that 
affect people’s everyday lives. The formula for certainty is:  (Familiarity + Spatial 
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Awareness + Temporal Awareness + Present Concern + Human Interest + Concreteness) 
– (Past Concern + Complexity). 
Commonality:  language highlighting the agreed-upon values of a group and 
rejecting idiosyncratic modes of engagement. The formula for certainty is:  (Centrality + 
Cooperation + Rapport) – (Diversity + Exclusion + Liberation). 
Further details of Diction and its various scales are available in the Users Manual 
accompanying the program. Here Certainty is taken as an example to illustrate how 
scores are derived - Tenacity is defined as all uses of the verb “to be” (is, am, will, shall), 
three definitive verb forms (has, must, do) and their variants as well as all associated 
contractions (he’ll, they’ve, ain’t) - these verbs connote confidence and totality; Leveling 
is words used to ignore individual differences and to build a sense of completeness and 
assurance: included are totalizing terms (everybody, anyone, each, fully) adverbs of 
permanence (always, completely, inevitably, consistently), and resolute adjectives 
(unconditional, consummate, absolute, open-and-shut).  
The Diction program also provides a set of norms for various kinds of content so 
that one can compare the text under scrutiny with similar documents. A distinctive 
feature of Diction 5.0 is that it comes equipped with a variety of norms users may employ 
for getting understanding of a given text or body of texts, which range from public 
speeches to poetry, from newspaper editorials to music lyrics, from business reports and 
scientific documents to television scripts and informal telephone conversations. 
According to its Users Manual, these normative data have been generated by running 
more than 20,000 texts through Diction (all texts were produced in the U.S. between 
1945 and 1998). The program stores means and variances for each category from 
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previous and extensive work with Diction, then compares them with the files created for 
a specific project.  
Diction can be used for a variety of research purposes. As Hart and Carroll (2008) 
assert, the Diction program has been largely used to study political messages, but it has 
also been used to analyze media reportage, corporate annual reports and vision 
statements, historical and literary documents, religious sermonizing, economic 
forecasting, medical documents, crisis communications and, increasingly, Web sites and 
internet traffic. While Diction is but one computer program available to researchers, Hart 
and Carroll contend that it is arguably the most “deductive” program available because 
(1) its dictionary structure has been conceptually derived and (2) it compares all output to 
a normative data bank, thereby (3) highlighting a given text’s rhetorical distinctions and 
(4) permitting immediate cross-comparisons to other Diction-processed texts. Carroll 
(2004) also argues that Diction 5.0 is particularly well-suited for agenda-setting studies 
because the program contains an assumption of additivity, which implies that a word used 
10 times is twice as important as a term used only five times, and that more is somehow 
better or worse than less. 
For this project, Diction provides an innovative way to examine the mass volume 
of text content – the media coverage of the nine global events/topics in the multiple 
countries examined (because Diction is English-based, the non-English news coverage 
was not examined). Hypothesis 4 (“Although the object agendas of the media outlets in 
different countries are similar, the attribute agendas are dissimilar”) was proposed based 
on the assumption that each individual nation-state has its own ideology and culture and 
therefore, the rhetorics in the media languages used in different countries are supposedly 
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dissimilar. For this, Diction agreeably serves the study purpose, given its theoretical 
foundation that words are important because they point to speakers’ (in the case of this 
project, news writers’) feelings and to the situations in which they find themselves. As 
Hart (2001) argues, words are shaped by cultural experiences, and they point back to 
those experiences – for instance, for most countries “progress” is enough, but Americans 
might demand a stronger form, “good progress.” Hart also suggests that words also point 
to the epistemological assumptions people make – for example, poets resist fixities, while 
engineers trust only nominalizations. 
The “relevance” function of the LexisNexis Academic database was used to sort 
the search results list of the news coverage items in each of the countries examined. The 
top ten relevant news coverage items for each global event/topic in each country’s major 
newspapers were sampled to be included in the semantics analysis. The body text of each 
of these top ten relevant news coverage items for each global event/topic in each 
country’s major newspapers12 were compiled into one file to be entered into Diction as 
unit of analysis. As a result of data collection, 63 (9 MSEs × 7 English Countries) units of 
text files were entered to the Diction text-analysis program and 302,910 words in total 
were analyzed. By comparing the five semantic scores of one country’s news accounts 
with another’s, it was possible to produce insights into whether an international 
intermedia attribute agenda-setting effect exists.    
The data set that Diction 5.0 generated (for a complete listing of the Diction 
scores, see Appendix 3) was converted to SPSS 12.0 for statistical analysis. Paired-
                                            
12 The total number of news coverage items on a certain MSE in a certain country’s newspapers 
may be fewer than 10. For example, LexisNexis returned only 7 “Bali Bombing” news items from 
searching the sampled Canadian newspaper. 
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sample t-tests were conducted to observe the relationships and differences among the 
different countries’ rhetoric of media coverage. 
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Figure 3-1 Public Agendas in 11 Countries 
Figure 3-1-1 
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Figure 3-1-2 
 
Public Agenda - Spanish
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
Ts
un
am
i
Ira
qW
ar
Hu
rric
an
Pp
De
ath
LB
om
bin
g
GW
arm
ing
Av
iaF
lu
BB
om
bin
g
Pa
kQ
ua
ke
MSE
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge MX_Pub
ES_Pub
AR_Pub
 
 49
Figure 3-1-3 
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Figure 3-2 Cross-Lagged Correlation Model 
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CHAPTER 4 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Public Object Agendas and Media Object Agendas 
 As illustrated in Appendix 2, in Australia, the Asian Tsunami is both the most-
cited Most Significant Event in public (27%) and the most covered in newspapers 
(N=1562); the least cited in public is the Pakistan Earthquake (0%) and the least covered 
in newspapers is the Avian Flu (N=34). In Canada, the Iraq War is both the most cited 
MSE in public (17%) and the most covered in newspapers (N=513); and the Bali 
Bombing is both the least cited in public (0%) and the least covered in newspapers (N=8). 
In Spain, Iraq War is also both the most cited MSE in public (28%) and the most covered 
in newspapers (N=163); the least cited in public is Pakistan Earthquake (0%) and the 
least covered in newspapers is Avian Flu (N=0). In France, Asian Tsunami is both the 
most cited MSE in public (14%) and the most covered in newspapers (N=136); the least 
cited in public is Pakistan Earthquake (0%) and the least covered in newspapers are Bali 
Bombing (N=0) and Pakistan Earthquake (N=0). In U.K., the most cited MSE in public is 
Asian Tsunami (16%) and the most covered in newspapers is Iraq War (N=1592); the 
least cited in public are Pope Death (.5%), Avian Flu (.5%), and Bali Bombing (.5%), and 
the least covered in newspapers is Bali Bombing (N=36). In the U.S., Iraq War is both the 
most cited MSE in public (27%) and the most covered in newspapers (N=2272); and the 
least cited in public is Avian Flu (0%) and the least covered is Bali Bombing (N=18). In 
Argentina, the Iraq War is also both the most cited MSE in public (25%) and the most 
covered in newspapers (N=34); Bali Bombing and Pakistan Earthquake are both the least 
cited in public (.5%) and the least covered in newspapers (N=0). In India, Asian Tsunami 
is both the most cited MSE in public (31%) and the most covered in newspapers 
(N=1144); the least cited in public are Avian Flu (0%) and Pakistan Earthquake (0%), 
and the least covered is Bali Bombing (N=5). In Kenya, the most cited MSE in public is 
Asian Tsunami (20%) and the least are Bali Bombing (0%) and Pakistan Earthquake 
(0%); the most covered in newspapers are Asian Tsunami (N=4) and Pope Death (N=4), 
and the least are U.S. Hurricanes (N=0), London Bombing (N=0), Bali Bombing (N=0), 
and Pakistan Earthquake (N=0). In Mexico, the most cited MSE in public is Global 
Warming (13%) and the least are Bali Bombing (0%) and Pakistan Earthquake (0%); the 
most covered in newspapers is U.S. Hurricanes (N=94) and the least is Bali Bombing 
(N=0). In the Philippines, Asian Tsunami is both the most cited MSE in public (21%) and 
the most covered in newspapers (N=99); the least cited in public are Global Warming 
(.5%) and Pakistan Earthquake (.5%) and the least covered in newspapers is London 
Bombing (N=0). 
Relationships between Public Object Agendas and Media Object Agendas 
 The overall correlation between media and public object agendas was first tested: 
For all 11 countries studied, the general correlation turned out to be significant (r = 0.573, 
p < 0.001, N = 9*11 = 99). Thus, the study further looked into the correlations for each of 
the individual countries. As Table 4-1 shows, the correspondences between the public 
and media agendas in 10 out of the 11 countries are highly significant (median correlation 
r = 0.855), with the U.S. having the astoundingly highest significant correlation (r = 
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0.982). The U.K. has the lowest significant correlation among the 10 countries, but it is 
still considered very strong (r = 0.692). The correlation for Mexico turned out to be non-
significant. The precise reason for this is unknown. One possible explanation lies in the 
availability of data sources in the LexisNexis database – for Mexico, among its top 
national dailies, the study included only El Universal in the search because it is the only 
one included in the database. El Universal is one of the oldest and most respected 
newspapers in Mexico, but its circulation has declined to the third in the nation, 
according to the most recent WPT (World Press Trends, 2005) statistics. And this may 
suggest that it is not very influential on public opinion in Mexico. 
The surprisingly high correlations found in the 10 different countries strongly 
suggest an object agenda-setting function of mass media around the world. Hypothesis 1 
(“There are positive correlations between the public agendas and media agendas in the 
countries studied”) is supported. 
International Intermedia Correlations 
Because of the aforementioned evidence of a global agenda-setting phenomenon, 
it is reasonable to expect international intermedia relationships. To test Hypothesis 2 
(“There are positive international intermedia correlations among the agendas of the media 
outlets of the countries studied”), the 55 sets of bivariate correlations among the media 
agendas of the 11 countries were calculated. As Table 4-2 illustrates, 20 pairs of bivariate 
correlations were found significant, with the highest significant correlation being 0.950 
(Canada and Argentina), and the lowest significant correlation being 0.670 (Argentina 
and Australia). Hypothesis 2 is partially supported. 
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Specifically, as the highlighted numbers in the table indicate, the U.S. media 
agenda significantly corresponds to the media agendas of the U.K., Canada, Spain, and 
Argentina; the U.K. media agenda is significantly positively associated with the media 
agendas of Canada, Spain, and Argentina, as well as the U.S.; the Canada media agenda 
significant corresponds to the media agendas of Australia, Spain, Argentina, and France, 
as well as the U.S., and the U.K.; the Australia media agenda significantly corresponds to 
the media agendas of India, Philippines, Spain, Argentina, and France, as well as Canada; 
the India media agenda significantly corresponds to the media agendas of the Philippines, 
and France, as well as Australia; the Kenya media agenda significantly corresponds to the 
Philippines’ media agenda; the Philippines media agenda significantly corresponds to 
France’s, as well as the media agendas of Australia, India, and Kenya; the Spain media 
agenda significantly corresponds to the media agendas of Argentina and France, as well 
as the U.S., the U.K, Canada, and Australia; the Argentina media agenda significantly 
corresponds to those of the U.S., the U.K., Canada, Australia, and Spain; and the France 
media agenda is significantly associated with those of Australia, India, and the 
Philippines.   
In these international intermedia agenda-setting tests, Mexico appears erratic 
again – its media agenda is not statistically significantly associated with those of any 
other countries. The study attributes this to the same reason explained in the findings and 
discussion regarding Hypothesis 1 – that El Universal might not be a powerful 
representative of the general media agenda in Mexico. It should be pointed out, however, 
that Mexico’s correlations with U.S. (.663), Canada (.496), and Argentina (.555) are 
fairly strong, although not statistically significant.  
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Intermedia agenda-setting has been well documented, although not in an 
internationally comparative context or a global level. As aforementioned, most previous 
agenda-setting research on intermedia agenda-setting effects is limited to the media 
outlets of one particular city, area, or country. For example, the pioneering studies 
typically focused on the vertical relationships between national news agencies and local 
newspapers in a specific country. Other studies focused on the horizontal relationships 
between different types of media outlets, such as newspaper versus television, in a local 
area. This study is the first to move beyond this limitation to test cross-national 
intermedia influence. 
Overall, although there is no perfect agreement, our hypothesis about international 
intermedia agenda-setting is supported in 20 of the 55 sets of comparisons. The 
significant correspondences suggest that an international intermedia agenda-setting 
function may exist among the news media in different countries about the globally 
significant events of the year of 2005. Without empirical evidence, one doesn’t want to 
speculate why a particular country’s media agenda is associated with the media agendas 
of some countries but not the others (and thus won’t assume that the intermedia 
correlation between the U.S. and France is non-significant because the French and 
Americans don’t like each other in many ways; or that the U.K. and Canada have 
significant intermedia correlation because, as a charter member of the British 
Commonwealth of Nations, Canada has connections with the United Kingdom in many 
aspects, etc.). However, this phenomenon can be discussed in general. News sources, 
other news media, and news norms can all play a direct or indirect role in shaping the 
media agenda (McCombs, 2004). In particular, interactions and relatedness, such as 
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colonial ties (Nnaemeka & Richstad, 1980; Atwood, 1985), language groups (Kariel & 
Rosenvall, 1983), can be of significant influence on this inter-nation intermedia matter. 
This international intermedia agenda-setting phenomenon found here can be 
attributed to three factors: 1) the nature of the BBC survey (it asks people from around 
the world “what event of global significance do you think will be seen as most 
important,” and in accordance with this, this study collected media data on these global 
events), 2) the Internet as a global news medium, which has made international 
intermedia agenda-setting possible because most of the media outlets have put their news 
products online, allowing instant access by other media outlets from around the world, 
and 3) most importantly, the superpower of Western media, whose global influence also 
has been well documented in previous research literature.  
It should be pointed out that the existence of an international intermedia agenda-
setting function of the mass media around the world is not proved by the correlations 
found in this part of the study, of course, but the evidence is in line with the conditions 
that must exist if such a function does occur. 
Cross-Lagged Comparisons 
Based on the international intermedia correlations found in the previous section, 
this study further speculated what kind of directions of intermedia agenda-setting, if there 
are any, exist in this seemingly interconnected global media world. As stated earlier, the 
Western media’s global influence has been well documented, and this study thus 
hypothesized such a directional international intermedia agenda-setting process (H3: 
Western countries’ media have more influence on the object agendas of non-Western 
countries’ media than vice versa). Such a directional hypothesis concerns cause and 
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effect. To test H3, a series of cross-lagged correlation analyses were conducted using 
object agendas of the 11 countries’ media. As mentioned in the method chapter, cross-
lagged correlations offer two advantages for hypothesis testing. First, two competing 
hypotheses are examined simultaneously: X causes Y and Y causes X. Furthermore, both 
of these hypotheses can be assessed by the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline, the level of 
correlation to be expected on the basis of the autocorrelations and synchronous 
correlations alone. 
After sorting out the panels containing non-significant cross-lagged correlations, 
14 panels that contain at least one significant cross-lagged correlation remained in the 
further comparison study (total number of panels is 55). Figure 4-1 illustrates the flow of 
international intermedia influences.13  
Figure 4-1-1 shows the correlation of the U.S. media agenda at Time 1 with the 
Canada media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: Canada media at 
Time 1 and U.S. media at Time 2. The correlation of .909 is greater than the reverse 
correlation .494 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of .699, indicating a 
significance influence from Canada to U.S. Figure 4-1-2 shows the correlation of the 
U.S. media agenda at Time 1 with the Spain media agenda at Time 2 compared with the 
reverse time order: Spain media at Time 1 and U.S. media at Time 2. The correlation of 
.873 is greater than the reverse correlation .340 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell 
Baseline of .581, indicating a significance influence from U.S. to Spain.  
                                            
13 In the analysis, the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline coefficient
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It accounts for the correlation that results purely from chance. Therefore, any cross-lagged 
correlation that is smaller than the baseline coefficient should be ignored. For more information 
about the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline coefficient or the cross-lagged statistics, see Cook, T. D. & 
Campbell R. D. (1979). Quasi-experimentation: Design & analysis issues for field settings (pp. 
309-321). Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin Company.  
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Figure 4-1-3 shows the correlation of the U.K. media agenda at Time 1 with the 
Australia media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: Australia media 
at Time 1 and U.K. media at Time 2. The direction of influence is not as clear cut as in 
the previous two pairs of countries because both correlations, .898 and .848 exceed the 
Baseline of .823, and the difference between the two is minor. Figure 4-1-4 shows the 
correlation of the U.K. media agenda at Time 1 with the Canada media agenda at Time 2 
compared with the reverse time order: Canada media at Time 1 and U.K. media at Time 
2. The correlation of .818 is greater than the reverse correlation .654 and is above the 
Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of .649. Although the reverse correlation of .654 exceeds the 
Baseline slightly, this cross-lagged panel is still identified as an indication of an influence 
from U.K. to Canada because it is not significant. Figure 4-1-5 shows the correlation of 
the U.K. media agenda at Time 1 with the France media agenda at Time 2 compared with 
the reverse time order: France media at Time 1 and U.K. media at Time 2. The 
correlation of .878 is greater than the reverse correlation .844 and is above the Rozelle-
Campbell Baseline of .857, indicating a significance influence from U.K. to France.  
Figure 4-1-6 shows the correlation of the U.K. media agenda at Time 1 with the India 
media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: India media at Time 1 and 
U.K. media at Time 2. The correlation of .862 is greater than the reverse correlation .745 
and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of .799, indicating a significance influence 
from U.K. to India. Figure 4-1-7 shows the correlation of the U.K. media agenda at Time 
1 with the Philippines media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: 
Philippines media at Time 1 and U.K. media at Time 2. The correlation of .858 is greater 
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than the reverse correlation .774 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of .811, 
indicating a significance influence from U.K. to the Philippines. 
 Figure 4-1-8 shows the correlation of the Philippines media agenda at Time 1 
with the Australia media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: 
Australia media at Time 1 and Philippines media at Time 2. The correlation of .944 is 
greater than the reverse correlation .894 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of 
.897, indicating a significance influence from Philippines to Australia. Figure 4-1-9 
shows the correlation of the Philippines media agenda at Time 1 with the France media 
agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: France media at Time 1 and 
Philippines media at Time 2. The correlation of .988 is greater than the reverse 
correlation .918 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of .950, indicating a 
significance influence from France to Philippines. Figure 4-1-10 shows the correlation of 
the Philippines media agenda at Time 1 with the India media agenda at Time 2 compared 
with the reverse time order: India media at Time 1 and Philippines media at Time 2. The 
correlation of .993 is greater than the reverse correlation .961 and is above the Rozelle-
Campbell Baseline .976, indicating a significance influence from Philippines to India. 
 Figure 4-1-11 shows the correlation of the India media agenda at Time 1 with the 
Australia media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: Australia media 
at Time 1 and India media at Time 2. The correlation of .892 is greater than the reverse 
correlation .848 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of .867, indicating a 
significance influence from India to Australia. Figure 4-1-12 shows the correlation of the 
India media agenda at Time 1 with the France media agenda at Time 2 compared with the 
reverse time order: France media at Time 1 and India media at Time 2. The correlation of 
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.991 is greater than the reverse correlation .876 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell 
Baseline of .931, indicating a significance influence from France to India.  
Figure 4-1-13 shows the correlation of the France media agenda at Time 1 with 
the Australia media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: Australia 
media at Time 1 and France media at Time 2. Again, the direction of influence is not as 
clear cut as in other pairs of countries because both correlations, .968 and .904 exceed the 
Baseline of .898. Although seemingly there is reciprocity, France media is likely to be the 
stronger agenda setter, since the correlation of the France media agenda at Time 1 with 
the Australia media agenda at Time 2 is greater and its significance level is higher. 
Figure 4-1-14 shows the correlation of the France media agenda at Time 1 with the 
Canada media agenda at Time 2 compared with the reverse time order: Canada media at 
Time 1 and France media at Time 2. The correlation of .865 is greater than the reverse 
correlation .675 and is above the Rozelle-Campbell Baseline of .672. Although the 
reverse correlation of .675 also exceeds the Baseline slightly, this cross-lagged panel is 
still identified as an indication of an influence from France to Canada because it is not 
significant. This is similar to the relationship between U.K. media and Canada media, as 
illustrated in Figure 4-1-4. 
 In summary (see Table 4-3), it seems U.K. is the most powerful global intermedia 
agenda setter, influencing the media of Canada, France, India, and The Philippines. 
France appears to be another powerful player, influencing Philippines, India, and Canada. 
The findings also suggest other international intermedia agenda influencers. These 
include The Philippines (influencing Australia, India), Canada (influencing U.S.), India 
(influencing Australia), and the U.S. (influencing Spain). 
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 The fact that U.K. and France were found to be powerful international intermedia 
agenda influencers is hardly surprising, given the two countries’ historical, political, 
economic and cultural influences in the world (Wu, 1998, 2000), and especially the 
world’s most influential news purveyors they possess – Reuters, Times, Guardian, 
Financial Times, Economist, BBC of U.K., and AFP, International Herald Tribune of 
France, etc., have long been regarded as the world’s opinion leaders. On the other hand, 
the fact that U.S. was not found as powerful an international intermedia influencer as 
U.K. and France is strikingly counterintuitive, considered its global influence as a nation-
state and as a media empire. It is also contradictory to existing research literature 
(Rampal, 1995; Volkmer, 1999; Wu, 2000), which has documented the powerful 
influence of its highly globalized media outlets, such as CNN and Associated Press. One 
possible explanation lies in the sample this study selected for U.S. media in this study, 
which are USA Today and The New York Times. As newspaper outlets circulated 
primarily in the relatively isolated American continent, their level of global impact may 
not be as much as that of their broadcasting or wire services counterparts. 
Without empirical evidence, one does not want to speculate why a particular 
country’s media have more influence on the media agendas of some other countries but 
not vice versa. We should be cautious to argue that the existence of a causal international 
intermedia agenda-setting function of the mass media around the world is proved by the 
cross-lagged correlations found in this study, although the evidence is in line with the 
conditions that must exist if such a function does occur. 
To draw conclusions for H3 involves how one defines the term “Western.” It has 
been found quite challenging to clearly define Western versus non-Western. The basic 
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definition of what constitutes “the West” varies, expanding and contracting over time, in 
relation to various circumstances. It is dependent on the context, which can be political, 
economic, cultural, linguistic, religious, and so on. The exact scope of the “Western 
countries” thus has to be somewhat subjective in nature, depending on what criteria are 
employed. There is always room for debate. In general, however, it is commonly agreed 
that, in a geopolitical context, it includes the countries of Western Europe, North 
America, Australia, and New Zealand. These are Western European or Western 
European-derived nations which enjoy relatively strong economics and stable 
governments, tolerate free Christian institutions, have chosen democracy as a form of 
governance, favor capitalism and free international trade, and have some form of political 
and military alliance or cooperation.  
In accordance with the commonly agreed geopolitical scope, six countries 
investigated in this study are defined as Western countries (AU, CA, UK, US, ES, FR) 
and the remaining five are non-Western (IN, KE, PH, AR, MX). Given this criterion, four 
composite variables were computed: the combined Western media agendas at Time 1 and 
Time 2, and non-Western media agendas at Time 1 and Time 2. Cross-lagged correlation 
analysis was conducted again to determine the direction of intermedia agenda-setting 
between the Western and non-Western countries. Figure 4-1-15 shows the correlation of 
the Western media agenda at Time 1 with the non-Western media agenda at Time 2 
compared with the reverse time order: Non-Western media at Time 1 and Western media 
at Time 2. The direction of influence is not clear cut because both cross-lagged 
correlations, .617 and .645, exceed the Baseline of .607, which suggests reciprocal 
influence. 
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It is a great pity that, based on the data this study was able to collect, three of the 
five non-Western countries, Argentina (missing data), Kenya (limited data), and Mexico 
(missing data), were not able to individually form any directional intermedia agenda-
setting relationship with their international counterparts. It should be pointed out, 
however, that India and The Philippines were found to have evident intermedia 
relationships with certain Western countries, although the direction is not unilateral. As 
mentioned earlier, the cross-lagged results indicate that India’s media agenda may be 
influenced by their U.K. and France counterparts, while in the meantime it may have an 
influence on Australia’s media. The results also suggest that The Philippines’ media 
seems to be influenced by U.K. and France media. In the meantime, it seems to have an 
effect on its Australia counterpart. Although such evidence supports the argument of 
Western countries’ media having stronger influence on non-Western media than vice 
versa, this study is reluctant to draw an overall conclusion for H3 based on only two non-
Western countries’ (IN and PH) relationships with the Westerns. 
The fact that this study has not found adequate evidence for an overall flow of 
media agenda from Western to non-Western countries suggests, on one hand, that the 
decades-old problems pointed out by the psychology-laden NWICO debates, which 
concern about the impact of Western powers, may need to be rethought to enhance our 
understanding of the global media landscape in the age of globalization. On the other 
hand, it also raises the questions about whether this lack of evidence may be due to 
sampling bias (at the country level, all the non-Western countries included in the study 
are either English or Spanish countries, which are generally closer to the West in many 
aspects than many other countries in the world; at the media level, only newspapers are 
 64
examined), or data deficiency (limited or missing data for some non-Western countries). 
The definition for Time 1 and Time 2 in testing this hypothesis (two consecutive weeks) 
may be another reason. Future research may test the same hypothesis by analyzing media 
content for constructed weeks, or a more extended period of time.  
Attribute Agendas 
As mentioned earlier in the literature review chapter, ideology is a source of news 
framing. H4 hypothesizes that the attribute agendas of the media in different countries are 
dissimilar (due to different ideologies), although the object agendas are similar. To test 
H4, Diction text-analysis software was used to obtain rhetoric scores so as to identify 
similarities and differences in the words of the media reporting of the nine global events 
in different countries. Because Diction is English-based, the non-English news coverage 
was excluded from this test. As a result, this step of the study includes media agendas of 
the seven English-as-official-language countries: Australia, Canada, U.K., India, Kenya, 
the Philippines, and the U.S.  
H4 was proposed based on the findings for H2, which revealed positive 
international intermedia correlations among the object agendas of the media outlets of 
some of the countries studied, including U.S. vs. U.K., Canada; U.K. vs. Canada; Canada 
vs. Australia; Australia vs. India, Philippines; India vs. Philippines; Kenya vs. 
Philippines. Therefore, testing H4 involved eight pairs of comparison of attribute 
agendas. 
The numerical data set as text analysis results that Diction 5.0 generated (see 
Appendix 3) were converted to SPSS 12.0 for statistical analysis. A series of paired-
sample t-tests were conducted to explore the relationship between each of the pairs of 
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countries’ media coverage (significance level set as .05). Table 4-4-1, 4-4-2, 4-4-3, 4-4-4, 
4-4-5, 4-4-6, 4-4-7, 4-4-8, and Figure 4-2-1, 4-2-2, 4-2-3, 4-2-4, 4-2-5, 4-2-6, 4-2-7, 4-2-
8 present the test results of differences and relationships.  
Table 4-4-1 and Figure 4-2-1 show that the U.K. news coverage and the U.S. 
news coverage on the most significant global events have no significant correlation on 
any of the rhetoric scores except for certainty (r = .818, p = .007, meaning that U.K. 
coverage and U.S. coverage are significantly similar in terms of certainty). Realism has a 
moderate r (.498). Overall, the U.K. rhetoric has no significant difference than the U.S. 
rhetoric, although U.S. seems to have higher level of activity than U.K., as shown in 
Figure 4-2-1A (if the significant level were set to be .10, this difference with t = -1.910 
and p = .092 would be considered significant). One can, however, see the apparent 
similarity in terms of certainty (see Figure 4-2-1C) – clearly, the two sets are positively 
correlated. 
Table 4-4-2 and Figure 4-2-2 show that the Canada news coverage and the U.S. 
news coverage on the most significant global events have no significant correlation on 
any of the rhetoric scores, although realism has a fairly strong r (.628, if the significant 
level were set to be .10, this relationship with p = .070 would be considered significant) 
and commonality has a moderate r (.445); and on average, the Canada rhetoric has no 
significant difference than the U.S. rhetoric (see Figure 4-2-2A, 4-2-2B, 4-2-2C, 4-2-2D, 
4-2-2E).  
Table 4-4-3 and Figure 4-2-3 show that the Canada news coverage and the U.K. 
news coverage on the most significant global events have no significant correlation on 
any of the rhetoric scores, although commonality has a moderate r (-.445); and on 
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average, the Canada rhetoric has no significant difference than the U.K. rhetoric (see 
Figure 4-2-3A, 4-2-3B, 4-2-3C, 4-2-3D, 4-2-3E). 
Table 4-4-4 and Figure 4-2-4 show that the Australia news coverage and the 
Canada news coverage on the most significant global events have no significant 
correlation on any of the rhetoric scores, although commonality has a moderate r (-.427); 
and on average, the Australia rhetoric has no significant difference than the Canada 
rhetoric (see Figure 4-2-4A, 4-2-4B, 4-2-4C, 4-2-4D, 4-2-4E). 
Table 4-4-5 and Figure 4-2-5 show that the Australia news coverage and the India 
news coverage on the most significant global events have no significant correlation on 
any of the rhetoric scores; and on average, the Australia rhetoric has no significant 
difference than the India rhetoric (see Figure 4-2-5A, 4-2-5B, 4-2-5C, 4-2-5D, 4-2-5E). 
However, as Figure 4-2-5C shows, India seems to have an obviously higher level of 
certainty than Australia (if the significant level were set to be .10, this difference with t = 
-1.941 and p = .088 would be considered significant). 
Table 4-4-6 and Figure 4-2-6 show that the Australia news coverage and the 
Philippines news coverage on the most significant global events have significant 
correlations on activity (r = .670, p = .048) and realism (r = .698, p = .037), but not on 
optimism, certainty, and commonality; and overall, the Australia rhetoric has no 
significant difference than the Philippines rhetoric. As Figure 4-2-6A, 4-2-6C, 4-2-6D, 4-
2-6E illustrate, the Australia and Philippines coverage show no apparent pattern of 
difference in terms of activity, certainty, realism and commonality. One can, however, 
detect that The Philippines has obviously higher level of optimism than Australia (see 
Figure 4-2-6B). If the significant level were set to be .10, this difference (t = -1.978, p = 
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.083) would be considered significant. On the other hand, one can see the apparent 
similarity in activity and realism, as illustrated in Figure 4-2-6A and 4-2-6D – clearly, 
both of the two pairs are positively correlated. 
Table 4-4-7 and Figure 4-2-7 show that the India news coverage and the 
Philippines news coverage on the most significant global events have no significant 
correlation on any of the rhetoric scores, although activity has a moderate r (-.453); and 
on average, the India rhetoric has no significant difference than the Philippines rhetoric 
(see Figure 4-2-7A, 4-2-7B, 4-2-7C, 4-2-7D, 4-2-7E). 
Table 4-4-8 and Figure 4-2-8 show that the Kenya news coverage and the 
Philippines news coverage on the most significant global events have no significant 
correlation on any of the rhetoric scores, although activity has a fairly strong r (.720) and 
commonality has a moderate r (.435); and on average, the Kenya rhetoric has no 
significant difference than the Philippines rhetoric, as Figure 4-2-8A, 4-2-8B, 4-2-8C, 4-
2-8D, 4-2-8E illustrate. However, as Figure 4-2-8A shows, Philippines seems to have a 
higher level of activity than Kenya. If the significant level were set to be .10, this 
difference (t = -1.557 and p = .098) would be considered significant. 
The overall pattern of the results is clear in that these findings, which are based on 
the Diction rhetoric scores, suggest no significant differences among the media coverage 
of the countries studied, although a certain country’s media coverage might seem more 
active, optimistic, or certain than another. Given the overall “no significant difference” 
pattern, we conclude that H4 is not supported. 
 News media are representatives of the countries where they root in and their 
practitioners do not operate in a social, political, economic and ideological vacuum. 
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Scholars have contended that news is a socially created product (Akhavan-Majid & 
Ramaprasad, 1998) and framing, as a process of news production, often is based on 
external values such as social norms, organizational constraints, and interest-group 
pressures (Tuchman, 1978). As mentioned earlier in the literature review chapter, 
ideology has been found to be a major source of framing in the news and framing is an 
important mechanism by which ideology is transmitted through the news. Akhavan-
Majid and Ramaprasad argue that three types of ideology – dominant ideology, elite 
ideology, and journalistic ideology, or occupational ideology – may be expected to exert 
primary influence on the framing of news. Akhavan-Majid and Ramaprasad (1998) found 
in their study a prominent role played by dominant ideology in the framing of 
international news – in the case of international news coverage, the dominant ideology of 
the nation, be it Western, Authoritarian, Developmental, Revolutionary, or Communist 
(Hachten & Scotton, 2007), appears to function as a major source of framing.  
Based on these understandings, this study hypothesized that the attribute agendas 
of the media in different countries are dissimilar (due to different ideologies), although 
the object agendas may be similar. The findings in this study, which suggest no clear 
pattern of differences in rhetoric, are strikingly surprising.  
The results of this study demonstrate just how complex the international 
intermedia relationship at the attribute level could be. Given that no significant 
differences were found in the study to support the “dissimilar attribute agenda” 
hypothesis, one is likely to infer that there must be similarities. The fact that the study 
found no overall trend of associations of attribute agendas among the countries either 
(except for a few sporadic occasions — U.K. and U.S. media are similar in terms of 
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certainty, and Australia and Philippines media are similar in terms of activity and 
realism) is counterintuitive.  
 The fact that this study found in general more evidence for similarity than 
dissimilarity in attribute agendas across the countries is comprehensible, however. This 
study examined the media content across the seven countries in 2005. By this time, four 
of the five non-Western countries included in this study – Argentina, Mexico (used to be 
authoritarian), India, Philippines – have more or less adopted Western media systems.  
Since the fall of the communist “second” world, the practices of Western mass 
communication have been more and more widely dispersed and accepted by people 
worldwide. Just like what Hachten and Scotton (2007) claim, the Western concept of 
journalism and mass communication has become the dominant model throughout the 
world and is widely emulated and many non-Western nations have adopted not only the 
logistics of the Western press and broadcasting but also its norms, ethical standards and 
philosophy.  
 With the collapse of communism, the Cold War framework that news 
professionals had long been using to select, structure and prioritize international news can 
not apply to the new world any more. Frames and angles that stem from the emerging, 
developing framework could all be very much different now. As globalization 
accelerates, the geographical and cultural borders for news are becoming more and more 
blurred. The confluence of an increasingly open political climate, growing economics in 
many non-Western countries, and the wonders of technology may have contributed to the 
blurring of ideological differences across different countries.  
Summary 
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 The results of this study provide insights into mass media’s agenda-setting 
function in the global context. The findings demonstrate how much the world has become 
globalized. First, similar patterns of the mass media’s agenda-setting function on the 
public are found in different countries around all the six continents. Second, news media 
in different countries around the world, using different official languages, seemed to 
perceive the same events as most significant.  
 The findings of this study focus on intermedia agenda-setting effects at the global 
level. Previous studies have documented an intermedia agenda-setting effect, as often 
indicated by a highly redundant news agenda within a country or culture. Across 
countries or cultures there may be considerable variation. This study, however, has 
revealed similar media agendas worldwide. It has found existing evidence for first-level 
(object agenda) inter-nation intermedia agenda-setting among the countries studies – 
twenty pairs of countries have significantly correlated media agendas.  
Moreover, based on the understanding of the “arterial process” (Breed, 1955) 
existing among media outlets (which means small news media sought guidance from 
larger news media), this study explored for evidence of directional inter-nation 
intermedia agenda-setting, presuming that the media of the politically, economically, and 
culturally pivotal and powerful West have stronger influence on their non-Western 
counterparts than vice versa (Wu, 1998). This study cannot argue a general causality 
between Western and non-Western countries’ media because of the lack of evidence due 
to limited or missing data for some non-Western countries. However, the effect of this 
minor data deficiency is uncritical because the findings for the individual countries still 
show us a colorful picture of the possible directional intermedia agenda-setting effects 
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worldwide. Future studies can address this Western vs. non-Western issue by expanding 
country and media outlet samples or using other data sources than LexisNexis. It should 
be stressed again, however, that the international intermedia agenda-setting process could 
be far more complex than we can disentangle with cross-lagged correlation techniques. 
Findings of causality from cross-lagged correlation analysis could be superficial or even 
spurious because a third factor may be at work on the relationship.  
 Furthermore, this study explored second-level (attribute agenda) intermedia 
agenda-setting effect at the global level. The multi-national investigation did not yield 
clear-cut results. In contradiction to our previous understanding of the relationships 
among ideology, nation-state, and media (Akhavan-Majid & Ramaprasad, 1998; Hachten 
& Scotton, 2007), which leads to a “dissimilar attribute agenda across nations” 
assumption, this study found no evidence of overall differences in media rhetoric. On the 
other hand, this study detected sporadic evidence of similarities in media rhetoric across 
certain nations, although there was no overall trend of associations universally. These 
suggest a complex inter-nation intermedia relationship at the attribute level and imply 
that, in the age of globalization, a simple “ideological difference” reasoning derived from 
the Cold War days is probably outdated. In an increased context of globalization, one 
should be cautions about assuming that the attribute agendas of the media in different 
countries are different due to different ideologies. 
 Diction software is useful for several reasons. It allows us to analyze mass volume 
of media content for various countries with the same set of semantics measures.  It 
becomes increasingly useful as more and more of the raw data of text content is made 
available in searchable electronic databases.  Semantics is part of the several theories of 
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media influence, and the level of words and their meanings in an agenda-setting process 
is one that deserves more attention. Although the Diction semantics scores analyzed in 
this study present neither really powerful nor general explanations of attribute agenda 
similarity and dissimilarity, one should not conclude that this method may be omitted 
from future analyses, but rather that it be supplemented by potentially more meaningful 
ones, including using human coders to verify Diction analysis and results. 
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Table 4-1 Correlations of Public Agendas and Media Agendas in 11 Countries 
 
Official Language Country Pearson r p
AU .966** < .001
CA .939** < .001
UK .692* .039
IN .879** .002
KE .736* .024
PH .801** .009
English
US .982** < .001
AR .855** .003
MX .131 (NS) .737
Spanish
ES .775* .014
French FR .730* .026
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 74
Table 4-2  International Intermedia Correlations 
 
 
 
    US UK CA AU IN KE PH MX ES AR 
UK r .722*    
  p .028 .   
CA r .774* .819**   
  p .014 .007 .   
AU r .267 .596 .756*   
  p .488 .090 .018 .   
IN r -.091 .231 .518 .821**   
  p .816 .550 .153 .007 .   
KE r .026 .192 .345 .481 .495   
  p .947 .621 .363 .190 .175 .   
PH r .002 .304 .574 .814** .838** .759*   
  p .996 .426 .106 .008 .005 .018 .   
MX r .663 .141 .496 .114 -.028 -.143 -.076   
  p .052 .717 .175 .769 .943 .714 .846 .  
ES r .684* .802** .931** .830** .590 .460 .641 .278  
  p .042 .009 <.001 .006 .094 .213 .063 .469 . 
AR r .832** .725* .950** .670* .398 .457 .547 .555 .919** 
  p .005 .027 <.001 .048 .289 .216 .127 .121 <.001 .
r .054 .245 .580 .777* .816** .566 .906** .111 .622 .555FR 
p .891 .526 .102 .014 .007 .112 .001 .776 .074 .121
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
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Table 4-3 Directions of Intermedia Agenda-Setting in 11 Countries 
 
 Country Influenced By Influencing 
AU FR, PH, IN  
CA UK, FR US 
ES US  
FR UK PH, IN, CA 
UK  CA, FR, IN, PH 
Western 
US CA ES 
AR   
IN UK, FR, PH AU 
KE   
MX   
Non-Western 
PH UK, FR AU, IN 
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Table 4-4 Paired-samples Correlations and Differences 
 
Table 4-4-1 Paired-samples correlations and differences: UK vs. US  
 
Pair r p   t p 
US-UK activity .117 .764   -1.910 .092
US-UK optimism .254 .510   -.133 .897
US-UK certainty .818 .007   -.592 .570
US-UK realism .498 .172   1.022 .337
US-UK commonality .253 .511   -1.439 .188
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Table 4-4-2 Paired-samples correlations and differences: CA vs. US  
 
Pair r p   t p 
CA-US activity .395 .293   -1.557 .158 
CA-US optimism -.241 .533   .312 .763 
CA-US certainty -.543 .131   .582 .577 
CA-US realism .628 .070   1.628 .142 
CA-US commonality -.445 .230   -.305 .768 
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Table 4-4-3 Paired-samples correlations and differences: CA vs. UK  
 
Pair r p   t p 
CA-UK activity .067 .864   .942 .374
CA-UK optimism .271 .481   .437 .673
CA-UK certainty -.390 .300   .738 .482
CA-UK realism .325 .394   .250 .809
CA-UK commonality -.445 .230   -.305 .768
 
 79
Table 4-4-4 Paired-samples correlations and differences: AU vs. CA  
 
Pair r p   t p 
AU-CA activity .064 .870   .070 .946 
AU-CA optimism .018 .963   -1.415 .195 
AU-CA certainty -.018 .963   -1.786 .112 
AU-CA realism .338 .374   .511 .623 
AU-CA commonality -.427 .251   .067 .948 
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Table 4-4-5 Paired-samples correlations and differences: AU vs. IN 
 
Pair r p   t p 
AU-IN activity .351 .354   .520 .617
AU-IN optimism -.365 .334   -1.247 .248
AU-IN certainty .040 .918   -1.941 .088
AU-IN realism .090 .819   1.121 .295
AU-IN commonality -.017 .966   -.021 .984
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Table 4-4-6 Paired-samples correlations and differences: AU vs. PH  
 
Pair r p   t p 
AU-PH activity .670 .048   1.373 .207 
AU-PH optimism -.362 .338   -1.978 .083 
AU-PH certainty .018 .964   -1.074 .314 
AU-PH realism .698 .037   .107 .918 
AU-PH commonality -.078 .841   -.884 .402 
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Table 4-4-7 Paired-samples correlations and differences: IN vs. PH  
 
Pair r p   t p 
IN-PH activity .453 .220   .768 .464
IN-PH optimism .059 .880   -1.439 .188
IN-PH certainty -.146 .708   1.534 .163
IN-PH realism .320 .401   -1.123 .294
IN-PH commonality .266 .488   -.852 .419
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Table 4-4-8 Paired-samples correlations and differences: KE vs. PH  
 
Pair r p   t p 
KE-PH activity .720 .106   -1.557 .098 
KE-PH optimism -.132 .802   .312 -1.883 
KE-PH certainty .325 .530   .582 1.974 
KE-PH realism .103 .846   1.628 -1.383 
KE-PH commonality .435 .388   -.305 .627 
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Figure 4-1 Cross-Lagged Correlations for International Intermedia Object Agendas 
*  Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
**  Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
 
 
Figure 4-1-1 U.S. vs. Canada 
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Figure 4-1-2 U.S. vs. Spain 
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Figure 4-1-3 U.K. vs. Australia 
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Figure 4-1-4 U.K. vs. Canada 
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Figure 4-1-5 U.K. vs. France 
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Figure 4-1-6 U.K. vs. India 
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Figure 4-1-7 U.K. vs. Philippines 
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Figure 4-1-8 Philippines vs. Australia 
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Figure 4-1-9 Philippines vs. France 
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Figure 4-1-10 Philippines vs. India 
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Figure 4-1-11 India vs. Australia 
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Figure 4-1-12 India vs. France 
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Figure 4-1-13 France vs. Australia 
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Figure 4-1-14 France vs. Canada 
 
 
.974**
.513 .946** 
.865*
.865* .675 
Time 1 
 
France 
Canada Canada 
France 
 
Time 2 
Rozelle-Campell Baseline = .672 
 
 
 
 98
Figure 4-1-15 Western vs. Non-Western 
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Figure 4-2 Comparison of Attribute Agendas 
Figure 4-2-1  Comparison of Diction scores: UK vs. US 
Figure 4-2-1A  Activity 
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Figure 4-2-1B  Optimism 
 
Tsunami
IraqW
ar
HurricanesUS
PopeDeath
LondonBomb
GlobalW
arm
AvianFlu
BaliBomb
EarthquakePK
MSE
45.00
46.00
47.00
48.00
49.00
50.00
51.00
52.00 UK_optimism
US_optimism
 
 
 101
Figure 4-2-1C  Certainty 
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Figure 4-2-1D  Realism  
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 Figure 4-2-1E  Commonality 
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Figure 4-2-2  Comparison of Diction scores: CA vs. US  
Figure 4-2-2A  Activity 
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Figure 4-2-2B  Optimism 
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Figure 4-2-2C  Certainty 
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Figure 4-2-2D  Realism  
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 Figure 4-2-2E  Commonality 
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 Figure 4-2-3  Comparison of Diction scores: CA vs. UK  
Figure 4-2-3A  Activity 
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Figure 4-2-3B  Optimism 
 
Tsunami
IraqWar
HurricanesUS
PopeDeath
LondonBomb
GlobalW
arm
AvianFlu
BaliBomb
EarthquakePK
MSE
45.00
46.00
47.00
48.00
49.00
50.00
51.00
52.00 CA_optimism
UK_optimism
 
 
 111
Figure 4-2-3C  Certainty 
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Figure 4-2-3D  Realism  
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 Figure 4-2-3E  Commonality 
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 Figure 4-2-4  Comparison of Diction scores: AU vs. CA  
Figure 4-2-4A  Activity 
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Figure 4-2-4B  Optimism 
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Figure 4-2-4C  Certainty 
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Figure 4-2-4D  Realism  
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 Figure 4-2-4E  Commonality 
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 Figure 4-2-5  Comparison of Diction scores: AU vs. IN  
Figure 4-2-5A  Activity 
 
Tsunami
IraqWar
HurricanesUS
PopeDeath
LondonBomb
GlobalW
arm
AvianFlu
BaliBomb
EarthquakePK
MSE
48.00
49.00
50.00
51.00
52.00
53.00
54.00
55.00 AU_activity
IN_activity
 
 
 120
Figure 4-2-5B  Optimism 
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Figure 4-2-5C  Certainty 
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Figure 4-2-5D  Realism  
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 Figure 4-2-5E  Commonality 
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 Figure 4-2-6  Comparison of Diction scores: AU vs. PH  
Figure 4-2-6A  Activity 
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Figure 4-2-6B  Optimism 
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Figure 4-2-6C  Certainty 
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Figure 4-2-6D  Realism  
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 Figure 4-2-6E  Commonality 
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 Figure 4-2-7  Comparison of Diction scores: IN vs. PH  
Figure 4-2-7A  Activity 
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Figure 4-2-7B  Optimism 
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Figure 4-2-7C  Certainty 
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Figure 4-2-7D  Realism  
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 Figure 4-2-7E  Commonality 
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 Figure 4-2-8  Comparison of Diction scores: KE vs. PH  
Figure 4-2-8A  Activity 
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Figure 4-2-8B  Optimism 
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Figure 4-2-8C  Certainty 
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Figure 4-2-8D  Realism  
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 Figure 4-2-8E  Commonality 
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RESEARCH 
By taking a cross-nationally comparative perspective on mass media’s agenda-
setting function, this exploratory study offers some initial insights into the agenda-setting 
process in a global context, both at the first level and second level. 
           The first contribution of this study is that it offers a general big picture of the 
object agenda-setting function of mass media around the world, rather than giving an 
account on one or two countries, like most previous research did. This was made possible 
by the multinational data source, which allows cross-national comparisons. 
           Another significance of this study is that it presents a new way to look at the 
intermedia agenda-setting relationship - that is, it moves this research from vertical (e.g., 
national wire services vs. local newspapers) or horizontal (e.g., local newspapers vs. local 
televisions) comparisons within a country, or a local area, to multinational intermedia 
comparisons. Given the rapid development of globalization and its impact on media 
outlets around the world, this is certainly noteworthy. This study thus opens the way to a 
new frontier in both international communication and agenda-setting research. 
Most significantly, this study is the first to explore directional intermedia agenda-
setting between Western and non-Western countries. Although this study did not acquire 
adequate evidence to support its hypothesis (it could be argued that the samples of 
countries and media outlets were too limited, or the content data source, LexisNexis, is 
inadequate for certain countries/media), this innovative approach itself is seminal and 
worth noting. Another innovation of this study is that it explored second level agenda-
setting across different countries’ media outlets, especially using computer-assisted 
content analysis method. The fact that the Diction semantics scores analyzed in this study 
provided neither really powerful nor general explanations of attribute agenda similarity 
and dissimilarity across the countries does not necessarily mean that this method is not 
optimal in serving the purpose, but rather that it can be supplemented by potentially more 
meaningful ones. 
The investigation of the directional intermedia agenda-setting between Western 
and non-Western countries did not yield clear-cut results. Although there was some 
evidence of causality between certain countries, the majority of the effects did not reach 
statistical significance. These initial observations, however, should not be considered 
conclusive. Overshadowing this study is the unanswered question, “Do Western 
countries’ media indeed have a stronger influence on the media agenda of non-Western 
countries than vice versa?” The inconclusive findings of this study certainly imply that 
further investigation is needed. Future research should aim at clarifying this issue, if 
conditions allow, with representative samples at both the country level and the media 
level.  
The 11-country sample is not systematically selected, or representative of some 
kind of random sample of countries, media, or news coverage. In addition, the number of 
the media sampled in each country is not the same. These reservations should be taken 
into account when assessing the results of this study and developing future research.  
Due to language barriers, this study was able to examine only those countries 
 141
whose official languages are English, Spanish, or French. Future research may include 
countries having other official languages to see an even bigger picture of the media 
world, if coders of other languages are available. Additionally, due to resource 
constraints, this study examined only major newspapers’ content as representatives of 
media agenda in each of the countries. Future research may expand the news content 
sample to multiple media types. What if television or radio outlets regard the world’s 
most significant events or most important problems in a different way than newspapers 
do? What if, determined by the particular nature of radio as a news medium, international 
intermedia influence across radio stations around the world is virtually impossible? – 
Maybe, maybe not. In addition, as the Internet has emerged as the “fourth mass medium,” 
and especially that it has drastically impacted the global media world as the newest 
context of news, it is important to pay attention to Internet news content in future 
research.  
Due to the limitation of the LexisNexis database’s capability, most non-English 
countries are not included in the content analysis of this project. However, representative 
countries, although their official languages are not English, are of significant importance 
in the global media landscape. The evolving media in the Arabs and the caged media in 
the free economy of China, in particular, are not to be missed (Hachten & Scotton, 2007; 
Paterson & Sreberny-Mohammadi, 2004). Possible remedies of this issue include 
methodological triangulation - that is, the use of other methods to study the same 
problems or further validate the outcomes and results. Sometimes referred to as the use of 
mixed methods, methodological triangulation provides a greater level of richness and 
detail, which in turn, increases interpretability, meaningfulness, and validity of the data 
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and the findings (Greene et al., 1989). As Keyton (2006) suggests, quantitative methods 
are weak for understanding people’s interpretations, and weak for discovering new 
phenomena, while qualitative methods are strong and useful for these. 
To further validate and explain the international intermedia agenda-setting 
process, qualitative methods, including focus groups and intensive interviews, can be 
employed to collect non-numerical data from media gatekeepers to study the countries 
that are missed in previous quantitative analyses.  
The prospects for news content selection and flow look better than ever before at 
the dawn of the 21st century. Thus, international communication, or global 
communication, as it is more trendily labeled nowadays, via the channels of news media 
appears more important than ever, and definitely needs to be further examined in this age 
of globalization. With the advent of more advanced technologies and more channels to 
access information worldwide, global news exchange will be much more rapid and 
diversified. The existing and newly discovered hypotheses pertaining to this research 
topic will have to be updated constantly. 
These suggestions in combination with the results of the content analyses in the 
current dissertation suggest that the context of increased globalization offers a rich 
opportunity to expand our theoretical horizons. The author hopes this dissertation can 
ignite the potential for new theoretical developments in both agenda-setting and 
international communication. 
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 APPENDIX 1 
“Most Significant Events” Survey Operationalization Details in 11 Countries 
Country Sample Size Sample Frame Type of Sample Survey Method Field Dates 
US 1000 18+ yrs National Telephone 11/14-30/2005 
UK 1000 18+ yrs National Telephone 11/11-17/2005 
CA 1004 18+ yrs National Telephone 11/14-26/2005 
AU 1026 18+ yrs National Telephone 11/25-12/09/2005 
IN 1452 18+ yrs National Face-to-face 11/20-30/2005 
KE 1005 18+ yrs National Face-to-face 12/01-08/2005 
PH 1000 18+ yrs Urban* Face-to-face 11/21-12/07/2005 
MX 1000 18+ yrs National Face-to-face 11/05-18/2005 
ES 1012 18+ yrs National Telephone 12/02-14/2005 
AR 1003 18+ yrs National Face-to-face 10/26-11/22/2005 
FR 1002 15+ yrs National Telephone 11/10-19/2005 
 * In the Philippines the survey was conducted in the National Capital Region, representing 27% of the total 
urban population. 
 
(Source from www.pipa.org) 
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